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Executive Summary
RUSI WAS COMMISSIONED by the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) to conduct an independent study into the use of data analytics by police forces in England and Wales, with a focus on algorithmic bias. The primary purpose of the project is to 
inform CDEI’s review of bias in algorithmic decision-making, which is focusing on four sectors, 
including policing, and working towards a draft framework for the ethical development and 
deployment of data analytics tools for policing.
This paper focuses on advanced algorithms used by the police to derive insights, inform 
operational decision-making or make predictions. Biometric technology, including live facial 
recognition, DNA analysis and fingerprint matching, are outside the direct scope of this study, 
as are covert surveillance capabilities and digital forensics technology, such as mobile phone 
data extraction and computer forensics. However, because many of the policy issues discussed 
in this paper stem from general underlying data protection and human rights frameworks, these 
issues will also be relevant to other police technologies, and their use must be considered in 
parallel to the tools examined in this paper.
The project involved engaging closely with senior police officers, government officials, 
academics, legal experts, regulatory and oversight bodies and civil society organisations. Sixty-
nine participants took part in the research in the form of semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups and roundtable discussions. The project has revealed widespread concern across the 
UK law enforcement community regarding the lack of official national guidance for the use 
of algorithms in policing, with respondents suggesting that this gap should be addressed as a 
matter of urgency.
In recent years, police use of algorithms has expanded significantly in scale and complexity. This 
is driven by three closely related factors. First, a significant increase in volume and complexity 
of digital data has necessitated the use of more sophisticated analysis tools. Second, ongoing 
austerity measures have resulted in a perceived need to allocate limited resources more 
efficiently based on a data driven assessment of risk and demand. And third, the police service 
is increasingly expected to adopt a preventative, rather than reactive posture, with greater 
emphasis on anticipating potential harm before it occurs.
While new data technologies clearly have the potential to improve police effectiveness and 
efficiency, concerns were raised regarding their development and implementation. Interviewees 
highlighted the lack of an evidence base, poor data quality and insufficient skills and expertise 
as three major barriers to successful implementation. In particular, the development of policing 
algorithms is often not underpinned by a robust empirical evidence base regarding their claimed 
benefits, scientific validity or cost effectiveness. A clear business case is therefore often absent. 
In the context of statistical forecasting, claims of ‘predictive accuracy’ are often misunderstood 
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or misinterpreted, making it difficult for the force to assess a tool’s real-world benefits. 
Furthermore, capability development is largely driven by data science, with comparatively little 
focus on the underlying conceptual framework, criminological theory or legal requirements.
Police use of advanced algorithms, predictive analytics and ‘data scoring’ tools raises various 
legal and ethical concerns. The deployment of such technology as a direct response to resourcing 
constraints prompts significant questions regarding necessity and proportionality: in some cases, 
it could be argued that the use of such tools would not be ‘necessary’ if the police force had the 
resources needed to deploy a non-technological solution to the problem at hand, which may be 
less intrusive in terms of its use of personal data. In addition to data protection issues, there are 
a number of human rights considerations, and concerns were raised that these are not always 
considered at the outset of new projects. To address these concerns, it is recommended that 
an integrated impact assessment – covering data protection, human rights, discrimination risk, 
assessment of empirical accuracy and operational effectiveness, as well as any other relevant 
legal requirements – should be conducted at the outset of any new police analytics project, to 
assess whether a clear justification for using the tool has been established.
While predictive policing tools have received much criticism for being ‘racially biased’, with 
claims that they over-predict individuals from certain minority groups, there is a lack of sufficient 
evidence to assess the extent to which bias in police use of algorithms actually occurs in 
practice in England and Wales, and whether this results in unlawful discrimination. Most studies 
purporting to demonstrate racial bias in police algorithms are based on analysis conducted in 
the US, and it is unclear whether these concerns are transferable to the UK context. However, 
there is a legitimate concern that the use of algorithms may replicate or amplify the disparities 
inherent in police-recorded data, potentially leading to discriminatory outcomes. For this 
reason, ongoing tracking of discrimination risk is needed at all stages of a police data analytics 
project, from problem formulation and tool design to testing and operational deployment.
Treating algorithmic insights as a form of ‘police intelligence’, associated with a level of 
confidence, would ensure that users of the tool critically assess the validity and relevance of all 
information when forming their overall judgement, thereby ensuring ultimate accountability of 
the decision-making process. When police forces procure ‘commercial off-the-shelf’ analytics 
tools, appropriate access rights must be granted for the force to be able to audit the underlying 
statistical models if needed, for instance to assess risk of bias and error rates. Intellectual 
property rights must not be a restriction on this scrutiny.
Research participants universally recognised a lack of any official national guidelines for police 
use of algorithms. Furthermore, interviews revealed a lack of clarity regarding the delineation 
of responsibilities between different organisations for the development of standards and 
guidelines, regulation and oversight. A new set of nationally approved guidelines appears  to 
be essential to ensure the legitimate development and deployment of statistical algorithms 
for policing. Establishing these guidelines will require a joint approach between the National 
Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and the Home Office, with input from the College of Policing. Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) should inspect 
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forces’ compliance against these standards as part of crime data integrity inspections, drawing 
on the combined expertise of the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission as appropriate. Context-specific evaluation methodologies should 
also be developed to ensure the empirical validity of statistical algorithms used by the police.
To ensure a coordinated approach to the development and deployment of data analytics tools in 
policing, the NPCC and Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) should establish a 
national coordinating group for data analytics. The group should maintain a high-level catalogue 
of all algorithms used by police forces nationwide to inform operational decision-making, and 
introduce a mechanism by which consistent specialist expertise can be accessed by forces in the 
areas of data science, ethics and tool evaluation. The group should also assess the feasibility 
of establishing a mechanism for police forces to access a centralised team of specialist legal 
advisers, in the same way that government departments can access specialist legal advice via 
the Government Legal Department.
There was widespread recognition of the need for meaningful and independent ‘ethical 
oversight’ of police data analytics projects, but a lack of clarity on how this should be achieved 
in practice. In particular, there was no definitive conclusion as to whether this oversight should 
be delivered at the local force level, or in the form of a centralised national structure (or both). 
It appears unlikely that existing general police ethics committees could provide meaningful 
ethical scrutiny of specialist police data analytics projects. However, the resource and funding 
requirements for the establishment of bespoke digital ethics committees are considerable 
and could be prohibitive, suggesting the need for forces and Police and Crime Commissioners 
(PCCs) to consider a regional model of digital ethics committees subject to consistent terms of 
reference and transparency requirements.
Any future policy framework should be principles-based and complement existing police 
guidance in a ‘tech-agnostic’ way. Rather than establishing prescriptive rules and standards 
for different data technologies, the framework should establish standardised processes to 
ensure that data analytics projects follow recommended routes for the empirical evaluation of 
algorithms within their operational context and evaluate the project against legal requirements 
and ethical standards. The new guidance should focus on ensuring multi-disciplinary legal, 
ethical and operational input from the outset of a police technology project; a standard process 
for model development, testing and evaluation; a clear focus on the human–machine interaction 
and the ultimate interventions a data driven process may inform; and ongoing tracking and 
mitigation of discrimination risk.
Recommendations
Police Forces
• Before investing in new data analytics software as a full operational capability, an 
integrated impact assessment should be conducted, to establish a clear legal basis and 
operational guidelines for use of the tool. This should incorporate the following elements:
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 Ê Data protection impact assessment.
 Ê Equality impact assessment, describing the potential impact of the proposed 
project on people with protected characteristics.
 Ê Human rights impact assessment.
 Ê Empirical evaluation of accuracy and operational assessment of 
‘real-world’ effectiveness.
 Ê Assessment of expected level of errors, where this can be established or 
estimated, and potential consequences of these errors.
 Ê Assessment of any positive obligations under Article 2 or Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights or associated public safeguarding issues.
 Ê Assessment of any other legal requirements which may be relevant for specific 
projects (for instance, investigatory powers authorisations, evidential or 
valid decision-making requirements pursuant to criminal procedure, PACE 
requirements and investigations legislation, and any limitations on interventions 
a statistical algorithm may inform).
 Ê Independent ethical assessment, the format of which will depend on what 
ethical oversight arrangements are in place.
• Throughout the project lifecycle, the police force should keep under constant review the 
resources required for the project and anticipated efficiency gains, to ensure the project 
is meeting its goals as set out in the initial business case and impact assessment.
• A ‘senior responsible owner’ should be assigned to each police data analytics project, to 
ensure full accountability to the Chief Constable and PCC, and oversight not just for the 
performance of the tool but also how it is deployed operationally.
• Statistical forecasting systems based on algorithms should not be described as 
‘predictive policing’ or ‘risk assessment’ tools, but more accurately as ‘classification and 
prioritisation systems’, with the human user maintaining ultimate responsibility for the 
overall risk assessment.
• The output of statistical algorithms should be classified as a form of police intelligence, 
alongside a confidence rating indicating the level of uncertainty associated with the 
prediction. How the confidence rating is established and maintained will depend on 
the type of algorithm used, and the method for calculating this should be established 
alongside routes for empirical evaluation. Officers and analysts should be expected to 
consider the output alongside other forms of relevant police intelligence when arriving 
at their overall judgement or decision.
Policing Bodies, Regulators and Other Government Departments
• The NPCC, in consultation with the APCC, should continue their ongoing work to develop 
new national guidelines for police use of data analytics, drawing on the existing ‘Algocare’ 
model and the framework currently being developed by the CDEI. The ‘integrated impact 
assessment’ detailed above should be a core requirement of these new guidelines. This 
new guidance should form part of the new ‘National Data Ethics Governance Model’ 
proposed in the recent NPCC-APCC ‘National Policing Digital Strategy’. The Home Office 
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should ensure that this work is appropriately supported, including by way of input from 
relevant stakeholders.
• HMICFRS should establish an External Reference Group for police use of data analytics, 
with a view to incorporating use of data analytics and its effectiveness into future 
crime data integrity inspections. This should draw upon the combined expertise of the 
Information Commissioner’s Office and the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
as appropriate.
• The NPCC and APCC should establish a national coordinating committee for data 
analytics. The group should:
 Ê Maintain a high-level catalogue of all algorithms used by police forces nationwide 
to inform operational decision-making, to encourage cooperation between 
forces, sharing of best practice and avoidance of duplication.
 Ê Introduce a mechanism by which consistent specialist expertise can be accessed 
by forces in the areas of data science, ethics and tool evaluation.
 Ê Explore the feasibility of establishing a mechanism for police forces to 
access a centralised team of specialist legal advisers, in a similar way that 
government departments can access specialist legal advice via the Government 
Legal Department.
• The UK Police Ethics Guidance Group should conduct a comprehensive review of ethics 
committees, to assess whether existing force ethics committees could be ‘upskilled’ to 
provide meaningful ethical review of police technology projects, or whether bespoke 
digital committees could be established in parallel. This review should also consider the 
viability, resourcing and funding requirements of a national or regional ethics review 
process based on standardised terms of reference.
• The Home Office Data and Identity Directorate should clarify roles and responsibilities 
regarding the development of context-specific evaluation methodologies for statistical 
algorithms used by police forces in England and Wales. This should include guidance 
on how confidence levels and error rates should be established, communicated and 
evaluated. These evaluation methodologies should be developed drawing on the 
expertise of the Forensic Science Regulator in establishing scientific standards for 
forensic science.
• Further empirical research is needed to assess the extent to which racial bias in police 
use of algorithms occurs in practice in the UK, and whether this results in unfair 
discrimination.
Software Developers
• When developing proprietary ‘commercial off-the-shelf’ algorithmic software for use 
by police forces, the provider must ensure appropriate rights of access are granted for 
the procuring force and national regulators to be able to audit the underlying statistical 
models if needed (for instance, to assess risk of bias and error rates). Intellectual property 
rights must not be a restriction on this scrutiny.
• When developing so-called ‘data scoring’ algorithms related to individuals, the use of 
unsupervised machine learning methods (such as auto-encoders) to create features 
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should be avoided at the feature engineering stage. Human-interpretable features are 
essential to provide sufficient transparency regarding what factors were taken into 
account during computation, assess whether the process was discriminatory, relevant 
and proportionate to the decision at hand or had any causal justification.
• To avoid model degradation, machine learning models should not be ‘retrained on the fly’, 
but should be reviewed and updated regularly, with particular focus on the suitability of 
the input data used, and the extent to which this is consistent with the original training 
data. This should be conducted by specialist data scientists while maintaining sufficient 
legal and operational input.
Introduction
Research Rationale
RUSI WAS COMMISSIONED by the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) to conduct an independent study into the use of data analytics by police forces in England and Wales, with a focus on algorithmic bias. The primary purpose of the project is to 
inform CDEI’s review of algorithmic bias in policing, one of four sectors under examination as 
part of CDEI’s wider review into bias in algorithmic decision-making.1 CDEI’s review will produce 
recommendations on how to manage bias in algorithmic decision-making, drawing on findings 
from these four sectors. As part of this review CDEI is working towards a draft framework for the 
ethical development and use of data analytics tools in policing.
Much commentary has highlighted the potential issues regarding the implementation of 
advanced analytics in policing, particularly relating to the impact on individual rights.2 The 
authors’ previous research has drawn attention to the limited evidence base on the efficacy 
and efficiency of different systems, their cost-effectiveness, their impact on individual rights 
and the extent to which they serve valid policing aims.3 Despite these concerns, there remains 
a significant lack of national guidance or standards regarding the use of data analytics tools in 
policing, with stakeholders from across the law enforcement community suggesting that this 
should be addressed as a matter of urgency.4
This project aims to address this gap. The purpose of the research is to collate and synthesise 
existing evidence regarding the police’s use of data analytics and associated legal and ethical 
concerns, and to engage closely with practitioners from across the UK law enforcement 
1. For further information, see Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI), ‘Interim Report: Review 
into Bias in Algorithmic Decision-Making’, 25 July 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/interim-reports-from-the-centre-for-data-ethics-and-innovation/interim-report-
review-into-bias-in-algorithmic-decision-making>, accessed 19 January 2020.
2. For example, see Hannah Couchman, ‘Policing by Machine: Predictive Policing and the Threat to 
Our Rights’, Liberty, January 2019; Rashida Richardson, Jason M Schultz and Kate Crawford, ‘Dirty 
Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, 
and Justice’, New York University Law Review, May 2019; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Rise of Big 
Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and the Future of Law Enforcement (New York, NY: NYU Press, 
2019).
3. Alexander Babuta, Marion Oswald and Christine Rinik, ‘Machine Learning Algorithms and Police 
Decision-Making: Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Challenges’, Whitehall Report, 3-18 (September 
2018).
4. Alexander Babuta and Marion Oswald, ‘Data Analytics and Algorithmic Bias in Policing’, RUSI 
Briefing Paper, September 2019.
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community, to explore in detail how these technologies are developed and deployed in the 
field, the legal and ethical concerns arising from their use, as well as processes and policies 
which could be implemented to address these concerns.
This project makes an important and timely contribution to the academic and policy landscape 
by providing new insights into police use of data analytics, drawing on first-hand experience of 
senior officers and government officials, as well as academic and legal expertise. It provides an 
independent evidence base to inform the development of new policy and guidance for police 
use of data analytics, specifically in relation to advanced algorithms.
Methodology
This project combined a targeted review of literature focused on data analytics and algorithmic 
bias with semi-structured interviews and focus groups with respondents from across the 
UK law enforcement and policymaking community. Twenty-six respondents participated in 
research interviews for the project: 15 representatives of UK law enforcement organisations; six 
academic and legal experts; three representatives of regulatory and oversight bodies; and two 
representatives from civil society organisations. Interviews were conducted in London between 
June and October 2019, with a number of these taking place via telephone (as indicated). In 
addition, two roundtable events were held in London in July 2019. The first brought together 16 
representatives from the commercial police technology sector and was organised in partnership 
with techUK, while the second brought together 27 participants from police forces, civil society 
organisations, government departments, academics and legal experts.5
A participatory research approach was chosen due to the value that can be gained from the 
experience of stakeholders in the assessment of the real-world context, diagnosis of the issues 
and consideration of policy requirements.6 Interviews and focus groups were conducted in 
a semi-structured format, enabling the research team to adopt a broadly consistent line of 
questioning in each interview, but allowing for flexibility to probe specialised areas of knowledge 
and experience in respondents. Interview request and guideline letters were sent in advance so 
that respondents had a clear understanding of the purpose of the project and were able to give 
their informed consent to the interview.
A purposive, selective sampling strategy was used, whereby participants were identified by 
who could provide detailed information about the issues under investigation. Participants 
5. Throughout this paper, an anonymised coding system is used to refer to interviewee data. The 
prefix ‘L’ is used to refer to law enforcement representatives, while ‘A’ refers to academic and legal 
experts, ‘R’ refers to members of regulatory or oversight bodies, and ‘C’ to representatives of civil 
society or campaigning organisations.
6. Andrea Cornwall and Rachel Jewkes, ‘What is Participatory Research?’, Social Science & Medicine 
(Vol. 41, No. 12, 1995), pp. 1667–76; Fiona de Londras, ‘Participatory Research: Some Provocations 
for Doctoral Students in Law’, in Laura Cahillane and Jennifer Schweppe (eds), Legal Research 
Methods: Principles and Practicalities (Dublin: Clarus, 2016), p. 150.
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were selected based on their first-hand knowledge and experience of developing, using or 
researching data analytics tools in the policing context. A snowball sampling strategy was used, 
whereby initial interviewees suggested subsequent participants for interview. Data saturation 
was reached, as indicated by the observation that latter interviews did not produce data that 
led to any new emergent themes.7 Interview data was analysed following an inductive grounded 
theory approach. A preliminary coding process allowed recurring themes to be identified, and 
then a more granular analysis allowed particular trends and patterns within these themes to be 
explored in further detail.8
This study has several limitations. First, although the authors consulted with respondents from 
UK-wide organisations, the scope of research is limited to the use of technology by police forces 
in England and Wales. The findings may not be generalisable to other law enforcement agencies, 
either in the UK or overseas. Second, the research is limited primarily to police technology 
projects which are in the (semi-) public domain. It is possible that other tools and capabilities 
are being developed beyond those discussed in this paper, which were not considered as 
part of this study.
Definitions and Scope
This paper focuses on police use of data analytics, more specifically the use of algorithms. 
An algorithm can be defined as ‘a set of mathematical instructions or rules that, especially 
if given to a computer, will help to calculate an answer to a problem’.9 As summarised by the 
Law Society, ‘given a specified computational problem which generally describes a desired 
input–output relationship, an algorithm describes a computational procedure which achieves 
this relationship’.10 Traditional rules-based algorithms rely on pre-programmed instructions 
(‘parameters’) specified by a human user. More complex algorithms are often ‘non-parametric’, 
meaning that the machine itself derives the relationship between inputs and outputs.
Machine learning (frequently referred to as ‘artificial intelligence’ or AI) is a specific category 
of advanced algorithm that is able to improve at a certain task after being exposed to new 
data. As summarised by Stuart J Russell and Peter Norvig, ‘an agent is learning if it improves 
7. Michelle O’Reilly and Nicola Parker, ‘“Unsatisfactory Saturation”: A Critical Exploration of the Notion 
of Saturated Sample Sizes in Qualitative Research’, Qualitative Research (Vol. 13, No. 2, 2013),  
pp. 190–97; Lisa M Given, 100 Questions (and Answers) About Qualitative Research (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2015), p. 135; Michael P Grady, Qualitative and Action Research: A 
Practitioner Handbook (Arlington, VA: PDK International, 1998), p. 26.
8. Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory, 3rd Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2008).
9. This definition of ‘algorithm’ comes from Colin McIntosh, Cambridge Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary, 4th Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
10. Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the Justice System and Law Society of 
England and Wales, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System’, June 2019, p. 10.
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its performance in future tasks after making observations about the world’.11 There are three 
main types of learning: supervised; unsupervised; and reinforcement learning. In supervised 
learning, the algorithm ‘observes some example input–output pairs and learns a function that 
maps from input to output’.12 In unsupervised learning, ‘the agent learns patterns in the input 
even though no explicit feedback is supplied’.13 In reinforcement learning, ‘the agent learns from 
a series of reinforcements – rewards or punishments’.14 A fourth category – semi-supervised 
learning – involves datasets where some input–output pairs are labelled but a large proportion 
are unlabelled.15
This paper focuses on algorithms used by the police to derive insights, inform operational 
decision-making or make predictions. Biometric technology, including live facial recognition, 
DNA analysis and fingerprint matching, are outside the direct scope of this study, as are covert 
surveillance capabilities and digital forensics technology, such as mobile phone data extraction 
and computer forensics.16 It is not the intention of this project to duplicate the ongoing policy 
development initiatives being conducted in these areas. However, because many of the policy 
issues discussed in this paper stem from general underlying data protection and human rights 
frameworks, these issues will also be relevant to other police technologies, and their use must 
be considered in parallel to the tools examined in this paper.
Throughout this paper, the terms ‘algorithms’ and ‘data analytics’ are used interchangeably, 
although the use of algorithms can be understood as one component of the wider data analytics 
process. ‘Algorithmic bias’ refers to a statistical algorithm that systematically and unfairly 
discriminates against certain individuals or groups of individuals in favour of others.17
11. Stuart J Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 3rd Edition (Harlow: 
Pearson Education Limited, 2016), p. 706.
12. Ibid., p. 695.
13. Ibid., p. 694.
14. Ibid., p. 695.
15. Ibid., p. 708.
16. For further discussion on live facial recognition and biometrics, see Peter Fussey and Daragh 
Murray, ‘Independent Report on the London Metropolitan Police Service’s Trial of Live Facial 
Recognition Technology’, The Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project, July 2019; and 
the independent review of the governance of biometric data currently being conducted by the 
Ada Lovelace Institute, <https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/our-work/identities-liberties/
independent-review-of-the-governance-of-biometric-data/>, accessed 13 February 2020. 
17. See Batya Friedman and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Bias in Computer Systems’, ACM Transactions on 
Information Systems (Vol. 14, No. 3, 1996), p. 332.
I. Police Use of Data Analytics
The Current Landscape
IN RECENT YEARS, police use of data analytics has expanded significantly in both scale and complexity. This is driven to a great extent by resourcing pressures, and a perceived need to allocate limited resources more efficiently based on a data driven assessment of 
risk and demand. Despite general cuts to police funding since 2010, specific funding for digital 
transformation has been made available, such as the Police Transformation Fund, ‘creating 
strong incentives for forces to frame the development around digital technology to receive 
further central support’.18
However, as has been discussed at length elsewhere,19 a lack of national coordination means that 
these initiatives remain highly localised, resulting in duplication of efforts, lack of knowledge 
transfer and poor system interoperability. As described by one senior officer interviewed for this 
project, ‘it’s a patchwork quilt, uncoordinated, and delivered to different standards in different 
settings and for different outcomes’.20 Another commented that:
there has been major investment in capability development for digital investigation and intelligence in 
recent years. But in terms of maturity, we’re right at the thin end of the wedge … It’s a very patchy and 
immature landscape. There are a range of tools that we’ve tried to consider the value, costs, benefits.21
Interviewees repeatedly mentioned that while public attention tends to focus on the more novel 
and innovative data capabilities (such as facial recognition or predictive analytics), the greatest 
benefit of these technologies lies in the ability to automate time-consuming and resource-
intensive data matching or investigative functions, for instance to consolidate information 
across multiple siloed databases:
The most successful examples don’t use ML [machine learning], they are factual data analytics, but 
nothing that would involve the human emotion or predictive side of things … My personal view is that 
it shouldn’t be about solving anything or giving the answers, it’s pointing people in certain directions.22
18. Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the Justice System and Law Society of 
England and Wales, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System’, p. 13.
19. For a more detailed discussion, see Alexander Babuta, ‘Big Data and Policing: An Assessment of 
Law Enforcement Requirements, Expectations and Priorities’, RUSI Occasional Papers (September 
2017).
20. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
21. Author telephone interview with L8, senior police officer, 23 July 2019.
22. Author telephone interview with L12 and L13, police respondents, 15 August 2019.
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We are often seduced by the talk of prediction and facial recognition, but a lot of the more important 
and perhaps mundane uses are in the background, more to harmonise big databases ... The predictive 
stuff may be a red herring.23
Predictive policing is like the icing on the cake, but it might not be a very good icing.24
Although still requiring legal justification, many of these ‘mundane’ uses may not carry the 
same legal and ethical complexities of more sophisticated algorithmic tools such as predictive 
analytics. As such, there is significant value to be gained from investing in systems to improve 
data quality and management, and automate core investigative activities, freeing up staff to 
focus on more complex and demanding analysis tasks.
Driving Factors
Research conducted for this study has found that the implementation of algorithms in policing 
is driven by three closely related factors: a significant increase in the volume and complexity of 
digital data that police forces are required to process; significantly reduced resources coupled 
with ever-increasing demand; and an increased focus on the preventative aspects of the police’s 
role in society.
Driver 1: Information Overload
A significant increase in the volume and complexity of digital data was identified as the primary 
factor driving the development of policing algorithms. Interviewees described an ‘information 
overload’, presenting greater challenges for police forces to effectively trawl large volumes of 
unstructured data and search across multiple, siloed data systems:
Data collection has exploded so we’re trying to leverage the opportunities that can come from data. A 
tipping point was reached quite some time ago … I don’t think people realise the volumes of data that 
21st-century police forces are working with.25
Within the datasets that we do have, we are missing things. There are opportunities for us to be more 
effective that we’re not taking because we are unaware of what’s in our data.26
There are clear benefits to these systems if appropriate safeguards are in place. They save police officers 
huge amounts of time in terms of the amounts of data they are able to analyse … That frees up police 
officers to be doing arguably what is much more important work.27
23. Author telephone interview with A4, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
24. Author interview with L14 and L15, senior police technologists, London, 19 September 2019.
25. Author telephone interview with L4, senior police technologist, 9 July 2019.
26. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
27. Author interview with A3, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
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Notably, technological advances did not emerge as a main factor in the increased adoption 
of policing algorithms, suggesting that innovation is primarily driven by limitations in existing 
data management processes and systems, rather than new tools becoming available. There 
was a recurring sentiment that a failure to effectively analyse this data to identify risk and 
vulnerability could equate to a failure to protect the public from harm. This perceived ‘obligation 
to innovate’ is directly linked to the police’s public protection duty and positive responsibilities 
under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): right to life and the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment respectively. One senior officer 
made the stark observation that – in the context of domestic abuse – ‘almost every victim of 
domestic homicide was already in our system’.28
Driver 2: More Demand, Fewer Resources
Ongoing austerity measures, coupled with a continuous increase in demand on police 
forces, was described by all officers interviewed as a main driver of the development of new 
data capabilities:
We live in an age of austerity, we have been for some time … It’s an increasingly complex world that we 
operate in with growing demand and reducing resources. There’s going to be opportunities to be more 
efficient in that world by using machine learning.29
We have less resources, more complex crime types that require complex responses and more intense 
responses … We always have to look at how we’re going to prioritise our resources, there’s always going 
to be a need to make a risk-based decision about what we’re going to apply our resource to, because 
we can’t do everything in its totality.30
The main driver is the increased demand on the force and the need to anticipate demand and deploy 
resources smarter.31
As discussed in a recent report from Cardiff University, these developments are part of a wider 
trend across the UK public sector of the use of algorithms and ‘data scoring’ to inform decision-
making and resource allocation in an age of austerity:
A recurring theme in the rationale for implementing data systems is the context of austerity, with 
managers and developers often responding to significant cuts by trying to use data to better target 
28. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
29. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
30. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 
2019.
31. Author telephone interview with L5, senior police technologist, 10 July 2019.
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resources. This speaks to the contextual duality of data driven technologies as one of data-rich and 
resource-poor contexts.32
However, while algorithmic tools present new opportunities for police forces to better manage 
demand, it was noted that such analysis would inevitably create additional demand, requiring 
the police to act on insights which may not have been generated otherwise:
There may be efficiency gains but this has to be caveated. Technology generates extra 
resource requirements.33
Many of these tools are demand creation, not demand reduction. How do we deal with the output?34
In our view the efficiency that it’s affording is a false economy, because ultimately there are aspects that 
are making the system less efficient. For instance, there is breakdown of communication and the police 
become less aware of why certain decisions are made.35
Driver 3: Increased Focus on Prevention
The police service is increasingly expected to adopt a preventative, rather than reactive, 
posture, with greater emphasis on anticipating potential harm before it occurs, identifying 
vulnerable individuals in need of safeguarding and targeting interventions towards the 
highest-risk persistent and prolific offenders.36 The NPCC-APCC ‘Policing Vision 2025’ affirms 
that ‘by 2025 the police service will have transformed the way it delivers its mission with a 
keen focus on prevention and vulnerability and the effective management of risk’.37 The 
recently published NPCC-APCC ‘National Policing Digital Strategy’ also includes a commitment 
to ‘translate evolving definitions of threat, harm and risk into digital formats that complement 
human judgement’ and ‘use digital tools to rapidly identify harm related behaviours in order 
to target interventions.’38 Interviewees described how the use of algorithms can inform a more 
proactive deployment of interventions towards particular areas or individuals identified as 
posing the greatest ‘risk’, or towards the highest-priority victims or potential victims:
32. Lina Dencik et al., ‘Data Scores as Governance: Investigating Uses of Citizen Scoring in Public 
Services’, Cardiff University, December 2018, p. 116.
33. Author telephone interview with A4, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
34. Author interview with L14 and L15, senior police technologists, London, 19 September 2019.
35. Author telephone interview with C2, representative of civil society organisation, 17 October 2019.
36. For further discussion, see Adam Crawford and Karen Evans, ‘Crime Prevention and Community 
Safety’, in Alison Liebling, Shadd Maruna and Lesley McAra, The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 
6th Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
37. National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC), 
‘Policing Vision 2025’, 2017, p. 5.
38. NPCC and APCC, ‘National Policing Digital Strategy: Digital, Data and Technology Strategy  
2020–2030’, January 2020, p. 7.
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Management of risk is becoming more and more prominent in lots of different areas of policing business 
… We’re much more focused on managing risk rather than simply catching the people who are involved 
in volume crime.39
Even a local beat manager will have thousands of offenders living in their area. Which ones are you 
going to prioritise? You need help with that, otherwise you’re continuously desk bound and doing 
research on different systems.40
There’s real room for that sort of tech to better identify high-risk, better screen out high-volume, low-
risk where we don’t need to prioritise resources, and it enables us to make better decisions and push 
our resources in the area of greatest need.41
However, it was also noted that the police are increasingly required to respond to non-crime 
problems where previously, another agency would have led the response. One senior police 
officer described a ‘need due to austerity to step into the space vacated by other partners, for 
instance mental health’.42 Previous reports have expressed concern that the use of new data 
analytics technologies risks broadening the police’s role into areas of social and public policy 
with unclear justification.43 This issue is explored further in Chapter II.
Issues and Limitations
While the research highlighted the potential of new data-driven technologies to improve police 
effectiveness and efficiency, concerns were raised regarding their development and operational 
implementation. The lack of a robust empirical evidence base, poor data quality and insufficient 
skills and expertise were identified as three major barriers to successful implementation.
Evidence Base
Research conducted for this study has found that the development of policing algorithms is 
often not underpinned by a robust empirical evidence base regarding their claimed benefits, 
predictive accuracy, scientific validity or cost effectiveness. Furthermore, capability development 
is largely driven by data science, with comparatively little focus on the underlying criminological 
theory, legal requirements or conceptual framework on which the technology is based:
39. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 
2019.
40. Author telephone interview with L4, senior police technologist, 9 July 2019.
41. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
42. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
43. Alan Turing Institute Data Ethics Group and Independent Digital Ethics Panel for Policing, ‘Ethics 
Advisory Report for West Midlands Police’, July 2017.
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Often the implementation and adoption of policing technology is done at quite a rapid pace, and what 
is often missing in those cases is a testing and assessment of the risks and long-term benefits that these 
systems may provide.44
There is a risk that we procure capabilities based on opinion-based decisions rather than  
evidence-based decisions.45
One of the reasons why the police want to see these tools work is that they want to save time and 
resource. But when you’re focused on saving time and resource, there isn’t going to be enough space 
to say, well actually, what we need is a 10-year research project to assess how algorithms and humans 
interact, and how we incorporate these tools into our criminal justice system.46
Data science-driven projects tend to be focused on allowing the data to lead to conclusions based 
on statistical correlations. The importance of causal justification, an underlying criminological 
or other evidentially informed theory behind the tool, and the legal relevance of the data inputs 
to the decision informed by the output, can all be overlooked. Although a data-driven project 
can correctly generate outputs that may suggest causation, without appropriate operational 
insight, data-driven projects might draw incorrect inference from the data outputs.
Data Quality
Concerns were also raised regarding the quality and integrity of police data, which may not lend 
itself to algorithmic analysis:
There needs to be earlier consideration of data quality and data input … data quality is the biggest risk 
– if you have poor data in the first place, you are in big trouble.47
There’s always issues around data quality, what you are and are not able to collect reliably.48
Interviewees stressed the importance of context when interpreting the reliability of 
police-recorded information, and the need for strong processes for data hygiene to ensure 
timely removal of inaccurate or misleading data.49 Conversely, interviewees also noted that the 
use of algorithms could result in the secondary benefit of causing police forces to pay closer 
attention to data quality:
44. Author interview with A3, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
45. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
46. Author telephone interview with C2, representative of civil society organisation, 17 October 2019.
47. Author interview with L14 and L15, senior police technologists, London, 19 September 2019.
48. Author interview with R3, member of regulatory/oversight body, London, 3 October 2019.
49. Author telephone interview with A5, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
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If use of algorithmic tools results in greater understanding of the data, this could of itself be a benefit, 
as it could result in reduction of errors and increase in quality of data.50
Even if none of the advantages come from the system itself, having a system like this forces you to keep 
track of the data you have, hopefully use it in decision-making, hopefully take an interest in data quality. 
That’s aside from whether ML is helping you to predict, classify or prioritise things.51
Skills and Expertise
Another common barrier to the successful deployment of data-driven policing tools is lack of 
access to skills and expertise, not just for the development of systems, but also for ongoing 
maintenance, validation, review and testing:
The big issue in policing is not the technology, it’s what the military call the ‘capability stack’, the 
combination of the technology, the people and the processes that need to be considered … There’s still 
a long way to go because we’re not considering all three.52
There’s resourcing issues. To properly test, validate and revalidate a tool requires continuing resource 
and expertise, and that’s not always in place.53
As such, while police forces often develop algorithmic tools with the objective of making more 
efficient use of limited resources, implementation will inevitably require investing in additional 
resources in the form of technical, legal and academic expertise.
Use Cases
Recent reports scrutinising police use of data analytics have focused on predictive analytics and 
algorithmic risk-assessment tools, collectively referred to as ‘predictive policing’ technology. 
In recent years, a number of police forces have developed sophisticated algorithmic tools for 
forecasting demand and assessing risk, which are now used for a diverse range of purposes.
Several interviewees noted that the term ‘predictive policing’ is potentially problematic. 
Many uses of advanced analytics focus on categorising and classifying entities into different 
groups – for instance, ‘risk scoring’ offenders according to their perceived likelihood of 
re-offending by comparison with selected characteristics of a specified group. While described 
as predictive, these algorithms are typically implemented as prioritisation tools – a higher ‘risk 
score’ does not necessarily imply that an individual is expected to commit crime; rather, the 
level of risk management required is judged to be greater than for other individuals within the 
same cohort. As described by one police respondent interviewed, ‘classification and prediction 
50. Author telephone interview with A1, academic policing expert, 1 June 2019.
51. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
52. Author telephone interview with L8, senior police officer, 23 July 2019.
53. Author interview with R3, member of regulatory/oversight body, London, 3 October 2019.
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is often the same thing. If you’ve got a question where you’re trying to calculate a probability, 
you are classifying and then applying that predictively’.54
With this in mind, it may be more accurate to describe these systems as classification 
tools – and not as risk assessments – with the risk-assessment element clearly specified as the 
human decision, taking into account the algorithmic classification together with the context and 
other relevant information.
Predictive Mapping
As shown in Figure 1, predictive crime mapping involves the use of statistical forecasting applied 
to crime data to identify locations where crime may be most likely to happen in the near future. 
The use of such technology can be traced back to at least 2004,55 and recent data suggests that 
as many as 12 (of 43) police forces in England and Wales are currently using or developing such 
systems, or have done so in recent years.56 The technique is based on the observation that 
repeat and ‘near-repeat’ victimisation accounts for a large proportion of all crime, and that 
crime is often ‘contagious’, with the risk of property crimes such as burglary greatly increasing 
for households near to the burgled property in the aftermath of the initial offence.57 The 
empirical basis for predictive mapping has been discussed at length elsewhere, and its use is 
widely advocated by academic criminologists.
In summary, random foot patrolling has a negligible impact on detecting and preventing 
crime, because crime is not uniformly distributed in time and space. By contrast, ‘hotspot’ 
policing – whereby high-risk locations are identified and patrol resources are concentrated in 
those areas – has been shown to result in crime suppression not just at the deployment location 
but also in the surrounding areas. Various randomised control trials have demonstrated that the 
correct use of predictive mapping software consistently increases the likelihood of detecting 
future crime events, resulting in net reductions in overall crime rates.58
54. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 2019.
55. Kate J Bowers, Shane D Johnson and Ken Pease, ‘Prospective Hot-Spotting: The Future of Crime 
Mapping?’, British Journal of Criminology (Vol. 44, No. 5, 2004), pp. 641–58; Shane D Johnson et 
al., ‘Prospective Crime Mapping in Operational Context: Final Report’, Home Office, Online Report 
19/07, 2007.
56. Couchman, ‘Policing by Machine’.
57. Graham Farrell and Ken Pease (eds), Repeat Victimization (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press: 2001).
58. For example, see Anthony A Braga and Brenda J Bond, ‘Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: 
A Randomized Controlled Trial’, Criminology (Vol. 46, No. 3, 2008), pp. 577–607; Johnson et al., 
‘Prospective Crime Mapping in Operational Context’; Rob T Guerette and Kate J Bowers, ‘Assessing 
the Extent of Crime Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits: A Review of Situational Crime 
Prevention Evaluations’, Criminology (Vol. 47, No. 4, 2009), pp. 1331–68; College of Policing, ‘The 
Effects of Hot-Spot Policing on Crime: What Works Briefing’, September 2013; George Mohler et 
al., ‘Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing’, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association (Vol. 110, No. 512, 2015), pp. 1399–411.
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One officer interviewed summarised the potential benefits of predictive mapping as follows:
If you have a capability to identify what kind of event is likely to occur where, you can then decide 
where your response officers should be at different times. Then you’ve got a tool that helps your senior 
officers plan ahead as to where to deploy resources. This could help greatly with resource allocation in 
real time on the ground.59
Numerous organisations have urged UK police forces to make better use of predictive mapping to 
enable more evidence-based deployment of resources.60 However, predictive mapping has been 
the subject of considerable criticism, particularly regarding the risk of bias and discrimination. 
A 2019 report from Liberty recommended that ‘police forces in the UK should end their use 
of predictive policing “mapping” programs, which rely on problematic historical arrest data 
and encourage the over-policing of marginalised communities’.61 These concerns are discussed 
further in Chapter III.
59. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 
2019.
60. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), ‘PEEL: Police 
Effectiveness 2016 – A National Overview’, 2017; Europol, Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment: Crime in the Age of Technology (The Hague: Europol, 2017), p. 25; London Assembly, 
Budget and Performance Committee, Smart Policing: How the Metropolitan Police Service Can 
Make Better Use of Technology (London: City Hall, 2013).
61. Couchman, ‘Policing by Machine’, p. 10.
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the Predictive Crime Hotspot Mapping Software Used by Kent Police
Source: Lizzie Dearden, ‘How Technology is Allowing Police to Predict Where and When Crime Will Happen’, The 
Independent, 7 October 2017.
Individual Risk Assessment
Algorithms can also be applied to individual-level personal data to assess the risk of future 
offending. An actuarial risk assessment instrument (ARAI) is a statistical model which uses 
pre-defined ‘risk factors’ to assign individuals numerical scores corresponding to their predicted 
likelihood of future offending.62 ARAIs based on simple rules-based algorithms have been used 
for offender risk assessment for over two decades.63 As Leam A Craig and Anthony Beech 
62. For further discussion, see Vernon L Quinsey et al., Violent Offenders: Appraising and Managing 
Risk, 2nd Edition (Worcester, MA: American Psychological Association, 2006).
63. See Mary Ann Campbell, Sheila French and Paul Gendreau, ‘The Prediction of Violence in Adult 
Offenders: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Instruments and Methods of Assessment’, Criminal 
Justice and Behavior (Vol. 36, No. 6, 2009), p. 569.
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describe, ‘in North America and the United Kingdom, actuarial risk assessment has permeated 
the entire criminal justice system’.64
In England and Wales, the most commonly used tools are the Offender Assessment System 
(OASys) and the Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS), which are routinely used by Her 
Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service to measure individuals’ likelihood of re-offending and to 
develop individual risk-management plans.65 OASys incorporates both static risk factors (such 
as age and criminal history) and dynamic risk factors (such as accommodation, employment 
and substance use), allowing progress and changes in offender behaviour to be monitored 
over time.66 OGRS includes only a limited range of static risk factors (age, gender and criminal 
history), and can therefore be used on a wider group of offenders than OASys (for instance, 
in situations where it is not possible to complete a more thorough assessment that includes 
socio-economic and personal risk factors).67 As described by one interviewee who was directly 
involved in the development of OASys and OGRS:
There is an established ‘what works’ evidence base for working with offenders … You should target 
more of your resources to high-risk offenders, there’s lots of research evidence around that … We 
developed actuarial tools because they outperform structured professional judgement, which we’ve 
shown through various empirical studies, certainly for general re-offending.68
It is important to note that experts continue to disagree over the statistical validity of individual 
risk-assessment tools. On the one hand, there is strong empirical evidence that the use of 
statistical methods improves the overall accuracy of professional (‘clinical’) judgements in a 
range of decision-making contexts, including offender risk assessment.69 On the other hand, it 
has been argued that aggregated ‘predictive accuracy’ rates are fundamentally misleading when 
assessing risk judgements at the individual level.70 The arguments are statistically complex and it 
64. Leam A Craig and Anthony Beech, ‘Best Practice in Conducting Actuarial Risk Assessments with 
Adult Sexual Offenders’, Journal of Sexual Aggression (Vol. 15, No. 2, 2009), p. 197.
65. Robin Moore (ed.), ‘A Compendium of Research and Analysis on the Offender Assessment System 
(OASys), 2009-2013’, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, July 2015.
66. Ibid., p. 3.
67. Ibid., p. 153.
68. Author interview with R3, member of regulatory/oversight body, London, 3 October 2019.
69. For example, see William M Grove et al., ‘Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-
Analysis’, Psychological Assessment, (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000), pp. 19–30; Stefania Ægisdóttir et 
al., ‘The Meta-Analysis of Clinical Judgment Project: Fifty-Six Years of Accumulated Research on 
Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction’, Counseling Psychologist (Vol. 34, No. 3, 2006), pp. 341–82; 
Mary Ann Campbell, Sheila French and Paul Gendreau, ‘The Prediction Of Violence In Adult 
Offenders’, Criminal Justice and Behavior (Vol. 36, No. 6), p. 569.
70. Alan A Sutherland et al., ‘Sexual Violence Risk Assessment: An Investigation of the Interrater 
Reliability of Professional Judgments Made Using the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol’, 
International Journal of Forensic Mental Health (Vol. 11, No. 2, 2012), p. 120.
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is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this issue in further detail, but suffice to say that the 
debate about which approach is more accurate, justified or informative is intense and ongoing.71
The College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice notes that ‘by definition, decisions 
involve uncertainty, i.e., the likelihood and impact of possible outcomes cannot be totally 
predicted, and no particular outcome can be guaranteed’.72 The first principle on risk is that ‘the 
willingness to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty (i.e., risk taking) is a core professional 
requirement of all members of the police service’.73 As summarised by officers interviewed:
In so many situations, the police need to make risk-based decisions based on what they’re presented 
with and what they see as part of their core policing role … The police need to be satisfied when 
they make their initial risk-based decision that they’re making that decision with the best possible 
information they can.74
Policing is about dealing with complexity, ambiguity and inconsistency… Sometimes you make decisions 
based on the most challenging information, but sometimes that’s the only information you’ve got.75
With this in mind, in order to assess whether use of a particular algorithmic tool is justified 
for offender assessment purposes, the focus should not be on the ‘predictive accuracy’ of the 
statistical forecast. Rather, the question should be whether the tool provides useable insights 
which enhance the officer’s ability to make an informed professional judgement in conditions 
of uncertainty.
As summarised by one interviewee, ‘It’s easy to criticise an actuarial approach but the question 
is what’s the alternative?’.76
Police Use of Data-Scoring Tools
While the use of simple rules-based algorithms for offender risk assessment is now a 
well-established practice, a more recent development is the use of advanced machine learning 
71. For further discussion, see Stephen D Hart and David J Cooke, ‘Another Look at the (Im-)Precision 
pf Individual Risk Estimates Made Using Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments’, Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law (Vol. 31, No. 1, 2013), pp. 81–102; David J Cooke and Christine Michie, ‘The 
Generalizability of the Risk Matrix 2000: On Model Shrinkage and the Misinterpretation of the 
Area Under the Curve’, Journal of Threat Assessment and Management (Vol. 1, No. 1, 2014),  
p. 42; Royal Statistical Society, ‘Algorithms in the Justice System: Some Statistical Issues’, evidence 
submitted to the Law Society Public Policy Commission on use of algorithms in the criminal justice 
system, November 2018.
72. College of Policing, ‘Authorised Professional Practice: Risk’.
73. Ibid.
74. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
75. Author telephone interview with L8, senior police officer, 23 July 2019.
76. Author interview with R3, member of regulatory/oversight body, London, 3 October 2019.
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algorithms applied to police data to generate ‘risk’ scores of known offenders. Examples include 
Durham Constabulary’s Harm Assessment Risk Tool (HART), Avon and Somerset Constabulary’s 
Qlik Sense data visualisation and risk-modelling system, Hampshire Constabulary’s domestic 
violence risk-forecasting model and West Midlands Police’s (WMP) draft Integrated Offender 
Management model.
Durham’s HART algorithm uses random forest forecasting (a form of supervised machine 
learning) to assign offenders into low-, medium- or high-risk groups corresponding to their 
predicted likelihood of re-offending over a 24-month period. This score is based on 34 predictor 
variables, including age, residential location and 29 factors relating to previous criminal history. 
The system is used to assess offenders’ eligibility to participate in Durham’s Checkpoint scheme, 
an out-of-court disposal designed to reduce re-offending by addressing the underlying factors 
causing individuals to engage in crime. The risk score is intended to be used as one of several 
factors for the human officer to consider when making their overall risk assessment, thereby 
enabling more targeted allocation of offender intervention programmes and, in turn, improving 
their overall success rate.77
Other police forces are exploring similar technology. Domestic violence is an area of policing 
substantially driven by a formal risk-assessment tool, the Domestic Abuse, Stalking and 
Honour-Based Violence Risk, Identification, Assessment and Management Model (‘DASH’). 
Recent research has suggested that existing risk-assessment methods such as DASH are ‘not 
enabling police forces to identify high-risk revictimization or recidivism cases’.78 The Hampshire 
Constabulary tool currently in development aims to use a machine learning model to improve 
the current risk-assessment process by providing an additional perpetrator-based risk 
classification.79
Avon and Somerset Constabulary’s Qlik Sense is a form of self-service analytics software that 
connects the force’s own internal databases and other local authority datasets, and applies 
predictive modelling to produce individual risk-assessment and intelligence profiles, to assist the 
force in triaging offenders according to their perceived level of risk (see Figure 2). As described 
in detail in Cardiff University’s report on citizen scoring, the system is used to assess individuals 
77. Author telephone interview with L7, senior police respondent, 18 July 2019; Chris Baraniuk, 
‘Durham Police AI to Help with Custody Decisions’, BBC, 10 May 2017; Sheena Urwin, ‘Algorithmic 
Forecasting of Offender Dangerousness for Police Custody Officers: An Assessment of Accuracy for 
the Durham Constabulary Model’, unpublished thesis, University of Cambridge, 2016, <https://
www.crim.cam.ac.uk/global/docs/theses/sheena-urwin-thesis-12-12-2016.pdf/at_download/file>, 
accessed 19 January 2020.
78. Emily Turner, Juanjo Medina and Gavin Brown, ‘Dashing Hopes? The Predictive Accuracy of 
Domestic Abuse Risk Assessment by Police’, British Journal of Criminology (Vol. 59, No. 5, 2019),  
p. 1028.
79. Petros Terzis, Marion Oswald and Christine Rinik, ‘Shaping the State of Machine Learning 
Algorithms Within Policing’, workshop report, University of Winchester, June 2019.
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for likelihood of offending, as well as risk of offending escalation, risk of becoming a victim of 
crime and risk of going missing.80
One police interviewee provided further details regarding how Qlik is implemented in practice:
We score everyone on the system daily (over 250,000 offenders within our crime and intelligence 
database). They’re getting scored every day on their likelihood of re-offending, and we’re also 
introducing the concept of crime harm ... It’s a screening tool to help read across massive volumes of 
data. I see it as being the equivalent of your intelligence analyst saying ‘Hey, I’ve identified these people 
who might be of interest to you’, but doing that en masse across your data. Our intelligence and live-cell 
colleagues need to know on a daily basis who the high-risk offenders are. The whole point of leveraging 
an algorithmic take on risk is that we can score 250,000 offenders every single day. You need to draw on 
an algorithm to make sense of that.81
In addition to Qlik’s offender scoring functionality, the interviewee also described a ‘crime 
data integrity model’ to ‘support us with our crime recording and to support our ethical crime 
recording approach’.82 The predictive models used for Qlik are subject to ongoing empirical 
validation: ‘We partition the data, we train the model, we test it … We re-visit our models on a 
quarterly basis to ensure the accuracy is being maintained … We won’t deploy a model that’s 
obviously not working, that isn’t accurate and adding value.’83
Figure 2: Screenshot of the Qlik Sense Data Visualisation Tool Used by Avon and Somerset Police
Source: Dencik et al., ‘Data Scores as Governance’, p. 78.
80. Dencik et al., ‘Data Scores as Governance’, pp. 74–81.
81. Author telephone interview with L4, senior police technologist, 9 July 2019.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
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While not yet implemented operationally, WMP have developed a pilot machine learning 
algorithm for assessing ‘offender escalation’, in order to identify individuals who are likely to 
transition from a state of low- to high-harm offending and deliver interventions to prevent 
them from doing so. The initial consideration of the first iteration of the model by the WMP 
data ethics committee included questions around the proposed use of intelligence as input data 
and how the model would be used operationally – for instance, ‘what interventions might be 
applied to those individuals identified, bearing in mind that potential adverse consequences 
of inaccurate predictions will be largely dependent on the type of intervention carried out?’.84
Beyond the uses described above, advanced algorithms are also used for complex investigative 
tasks. Two interviewees involved in serious crime investigations described how automation of 
bulk-data analysis has provided significant efficiency savings when investigating online child sex 
abuse and exploitation (CSAE). The interviewees described how their agency has developed a 
machine learning ‘prioritisation tool’ to identify high-risk users of child abuse forums who may 
have the potential to harm a child:
We’ve got a massive amount of data from closed cases and known offenders that hasn’t been explored 
for other intelligence, offences and connections between individuals … We’re systematically re-
processing that data to identify new offences and to identify behaviours … We’re looking at the entire 
dataset, identifying further victims, finding links, understanding how offenders communicate.85
The algorithm uses semantic keyword matching in combination with machine learning 
risk assessment to identify high-risk users who should be subject to more detailed, manual 
examination. The participants described how they have seen a ‘quantifiable increase in 
efficiency’, explaining how previously it would take up to two months for an officer to manually 
risk assess each forum user, by reading each of their forum posts. This manual risk-assessment 
process was used to train a machine learning algorithm to identify risk factors which could then 
be used predictively using a support vector machine learning model. Not only has the system 
led to efficiency improvements in what was previously a ‘highly resource-intensive’ process, but 
it has led to new users being identified who were not previously known.86
Complex algorithms are also used by the police for numerous other purposes, including to forecast 
demand in control centres,87 and triage crimes for investigation according to their predicted 
‘solveability’.88 But despite these diverse applications, there are a number of fundamental 
cross-cutting legal and ethical considerations arising from the application of complex algorithms 
to police data. This is the focus of the following chapter.
84. West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner, ‘Ethics Committee Reports and Minutes’, April 
2019, <https://www.westmidlands-pcc.gov.uk/ethics-committee/ethics-committee-reports-and-
minutes/>, accessed 19 January 2020.
85. Author telephone interview with L9 and L10, police investigator and analyst, 1 August 2019.
86. Ibid.
87. Author telephone interview with L4, senior police technologist, 9 July 2019.
88. See HMICFRS, ‘PEEL: Police Effectiveness 2017 – An Inspection of Kent Police’, March 2018.

II. Legal Considerations
THIS CHAPTER DISCUSSES legal and ethical concerns identified in the research, organised by reference to the legal framework(s) concerned. For reasons of space, it is not possible to include a full description of all relevant legal frameworks, although the reader is 
directed to the authors’ previous publications for further discussion.89 Bias and discrimination 
are discussed in further detail in Chapter III.
A focus on ‘data ethics’ may distract from fundamental questions regarding the underlying legal 
basis for police use of algorithms, and whether use of a new analytical tool would constitute lawful 
exercise of police powers. As summarised by one civil society representative, ‘We need to move 
away from discussions that are about ethics, and move towards thinking about objective human 
rights standards’.90 It was noted that there are clearly developed human rights standards that 
would apply well to the policing context, rather than focusing on nebulous data-ethics principles:
We hear a lot of talk about things like fairness, accountability and transparency. All of that is important, 
but they are bypassing a discussion that needs to be had in the first instance, which is ‘are these tools 
rights compliant?’ and if they aren’t rights compliant, they shouldn’t be used in the policing context.91
Various legal frameworks and codes of practice are relevant to the use of policing algorithms in 
England and Wales. However, concerns were raised that these legal requirements are not being 
considered at the outset of police technology projects:
While there’s an awareness of the relevant legal and governance requirements, there’s still a significant 
delay in bringing the relevant external legal experts in at the early stages of these projects. There 
needs to be at the very beginning of these projects consultation with whoever has been assigned the 
competent data protection officer within that police agency.92
Data Protection
The main concern raised in relation to data protection was that the Data Protection Act (DPA) 
2018 does not provide sufficient protection from automated decision-making. Echoing a 
previous recommendation from the Law Society,93 one participant noted the risk that officers 
89. Babuta, Oswald and Rinik, ‘Machine Learning Algorithms and Police Decision-Making’; Babuta and 
Oswald, ‘Data Analytics and Algorithmic Bias in Policing’.
90. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
91. Author telephone interview with C2, representative of civil society organisation, 17 October 2019.
92. Author interview with A3, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
93. The Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the Justice System and the Law Society of 
England and Wales, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System’, p. 6.
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may in practice defer decision-making responsibility to an algorithm and not challenge the 
outputs, and called for an amendment to Part 3 of the DPA to specify that meaningful human 
input should be a legal requirement when an algorithmic tool informs a decision-making process 
which has a legally significant or similarly significant effect on an individual, applicable to many 
algorithms within policing:
The Data Protection Act doesn’t put safeguards in place for meaningful human intervention. It has to be 
meaningful, it can’t just be a box-tick. Police forces cannot be making these serious decisions on people 
on an automated basis.94
Another concern relates to the police’s access to third-party data from organisations such as 
local authorities and social services, with one roundtable participant describing how:
Predictive analytics works best when you’re able to build them on a wide variety of relevant data … At 
the moment it’s hard to do that because of the data-sharing issue ... Projects that we’ve really struggled 
with, it’s primarily because we haven’t been able to get the data at the right time.95
A civil society representative noted that ‘there are potentially serious problems with using other 
data, healthcare, social services, local authorities. The problem here isn’t so much around bias 
and discrimination, but it raises very serious data protection questions’.96
Human Rights
Much police activity inevitably involves infringing on citizens’ civil liberties and human rights. 
In cases where there is judged to be some level of intrusion, the authority must be able to 
demonstrate that such intrusion is in accordance with the law, and necessary and proportionate 
in the interests of public safety or for the prevention of disorder or crime.
Police interviewees pointed to obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which can imply a positive obligation to take preventative operational measures 
to protect a person whose life is at risk:97
From a human rights point of view, the safety and security of citizens is the first responsibility of the 
state, and algorithms could contribute to this responsibility.98
In relation to the right to fair trial and the presumption of innocence (Article 6 ECHR), one civil 
society representative suggested that ‘there’s a serious problem around the reversal of the 
94. Author interview with C1, representative of civil society organisation, London, 7 October 2019. 
95. Roundtable event organised in partnership with techUK, London, 22 July 2019.
96. Author interview with C1, representative of civil society organisation, London, 7 October 2019.
97. See Osman v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 87/1997/871/1083, 1998.
98. Author telephone interview with A4, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
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presumption of innocence’.99 It was further noted that machine learning algorithms often work 
by detecting associations and connections, which could engage Article 10 and 11 ECHR (right to 
freedom of expression, and right to freedom of assembly and association, respectively).100 One 
civil society representative suggested that ‘things that aren’t even criminal in nature, people 
may feel intimidated out of when they know the police are assessing them in detail. Things like 
attending protests, expressing political dissent’.101
Where there is a potential intrusion into an individual right due to collection and use of personal 
data or the use of an algorithmic output, this raises complex questions regarding necessity 
and proportionality. In some cases, it could be argued that the use of such technology would 
not be ‘necessary’ if the police force had the necessary resources to deploy a less intrusive, 
non-technological solution. One senior police officer asked: ‘Should we be potentially 
infringing people’s rights to be more efficient, when we arguably wouldn’t need to be if we had 
more resources?’.102
In relation to proportionality, the collection of large volumes of data to build a complex algorithm 
may not be proportionate in relation to the benefits offered by the tool. As summarised by one 
civil society representative, ‘To use these predictive policing programmes, we obviously need huge 
amounts of data, which runs contrary to the principle of data minimisation’.103 In some cases, the 
developer of a system may seek to collect more and more data to correct errors and deficiencies 
in the system, potentially resulting in indiscriminate or disproportionate data collection.104
The Role of the Police
Some have argued that the use of certain new technologies risks broadening the police service’s 
role into other areas of social policy, with unclear justification. In their review of the National 
Analytics Solution (NAS), a project to trial predictive analytics techniques for policing, the 
Alan Turing Institute Data Ethics Group and the Independent Digital Ethics Panel for Policing 
concluded that:
We see the NAS as moving law enforcement away from its traditional crime-related role and into 
wider and deeper aspects of social and public policy. This move requires explanation, justification 
and legitimation, especially where the ethical dimensions and principles of such policing roles are not 
well established.105
99. Author interview with C1, representative of civil society organisation, London, 7 October 2019.
100. Author telephone interview with A4, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
101. Author telephone interview with C2, representative of civil society organisation, 17 October 2019.
102. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
103. Author telephone interview with C2, representative of civil society organisation, 17 October 2019.
104. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
105. Alan Turing Institute Data Ethics Group and Independent Digital Ethics Panel for Policing, ‘Ethics 
Advisory Report for West Midlands Police’.
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The NAS project team responded that they did not believe that this characterisation reflected 
the nature of the modern police service:
While the core function of the Police is the prevention and detection of crime there are numerous areas 
where we invest resources not directly linked to this such as – inter alia – locating missing persons, 
dealing with people in crisis with mental health issues (often as a joint team with health services), 
road traffic accidents including fatalities where there is no element of criminal activity, dealing with 
the homeless, responding to suicide, domestic abuse where there is no recordable crime and dealing 
with anti-social behaviour issues that do not constitute crime but nevertheless have the ability to have 
a significant impact on the quality of life of the public affected by them.106
In general, interview data affirmed the latter characterisation:
In reality, detecting and preventing crime is quite a small part of our business … We do many other 
things, and for a long period of time, a lot of the other stuff that isn’t pure prevention and detection of 
crime has been a holistic approach together with other partners.107
It’s really difficult to separate the police role from the role of other agencies like children’s services 
… We need to come together with shared datasets and shared priorities to use this technology 
better together.108
While some may argue that – in an ideal world – the police would not be required to intervene 
in areas of social policy which do not have a direct criminal element, in reality a large proportion 
of all police time is spent responding to public safety problems, and this situation is set to 
persist for the foreseeable future. However, further evidence is needed to demonstrate that 
the use of algorithms would enable the police to carry out these duties more effectively and 
proportionately.
Transparency, Explainability and Accountability
Much commentary has highlighted the risks of so-called ‘black box’ machine learning methods 
which offer little explanation as to how they arrived at their outputs.109 As summarised by 
the Law Society:
106. West Midlands Police, ‘National Analytics Solution Project Team: Response to the Alan Turing 
Institute and IDEPP’, <https://idepp.org/NAS-project-team-response.pdf>, accessed 19 January 
2020.
107. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 
2019.
108. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
109. For further discussion, see Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm? Why 
a “Right to an Explanation” is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For’, Duke Law & 
Technology Review (Vol. 16, No. 1, 2017), p. 18.
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Machine learning systems, in contrast to rule-based systems, are not designed with human 
interpretability in mind, but optimised instead for connection of input and output data with little regard 
for the comprehensibility of such connections.110
Interviewees recognised a lack of transparency as one of the most significant risks of using 
machine learning algorithms for policing:
It’s harder for ML, for that we just get a ‘medium-risk’ score, we can’t really identify why that’s medium risk.111
You can interrogate the human, but it’s much harder to interrogate the technology.112
An expert who played a major role in the development and evaluation of OASys explained that 
machine learning has never been incorporated into OASys or OGRS, primarily due to concerns 
regarding the ‘black box’ problem: ‘to use machine learning, the predictive validity would have 
to be significantly higher to justify losing that explainability’.113
However, while machine learning is often referred to as ‘black box’, different methods vary 
considerably in their transparency, which has implications for what type of algorithm may be 
suitable in a particular policing context. Supervised machine learning involves explicitly defining 
input variables and output (target) variables, and training an algorithm to learn how to ‘map’ 
a function from the input to the output. As such, the factors taken into account when making 
the prediction are explicitly defined by the user. Unsupervised learning falls broadly into two 
categories. The first could be defined as ‘exploratory’ unsupervised learning, and does not 
specify an output or target variable, but rather attempts to model the underlying distribution 
in the data through clustering or association (such as k-nearest neighbours classification). The 
second category involves the use of unsupervised methods to create features to then be used in a 
supervised learning task (such as feed-forward auto-encoders built on artificial neural networks). 
For example, this latter category could include the use of an unsupervised autoencoder to build 
new features based on complicated combinations of simpler, human-interpretable features 
(such as age, gender, postcode, and so forth). The resulting features could then be used as input 
variables for a supervised learning algorithm, such as those designed to assess offending risk. 
However, in this scenario, the specific factors taken into account when deriving the final ‘risk 
score’ may be impossible to discern, due to the use of an unsupervised auto-encoder.
An academic expert suggested that ‘essentially, best practice would be to veer away from the 
use of deep neural networks, in the sense that there is a significant decision-making stage that 
110. The Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the Justice System and the Law Society of 
England and Wales, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System’, p. 21.
111. Author telephone interview with L9 and L10, police investigator and analyst, 1 August 2019.
112. Comment made by a civil society representative at a roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, 
London, 25 July 2019.
113. Author interview with R3, member of regulatory/oversight body, London, 3 October 2019.
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we can’t account for. That is deeply problematic’.114 Another commented that ‘I don’t know 
how you would assess fairness in unsupervised learning. I can’t think of a predictive policing 
application where unsupervised method would improve things because there is always a 
label on the offence’.115 For this reason, it would seem inappropriate to employ unsupervised 
machine learning methods when developing so-called ‘data scoring’ algorithms related to 
individuals in a policing context. Human-interpretable features are essential to provide sufficient 
transparency regarding what factors were taken into account to arrive at a certain outcome, 
assess whether the process was discriminatory, relevant and proportionate to the decision at 
hand or had any causal justification.
A closely related issue concerns the accountability of the decision-making process. As summarised 
by one police representative interviewed, ‘Who gets in trouble when it goes wrong? You need 
to make sure people are still accountable for the machine and what it does’.116 To address this 
issue, it is essential to build audit logs into the systems, ensuring there is a clear process to 
record the reasons why officers take certain action on the basis of an algorithmic output.117 
The NPCC-APCC ‘National Policing Digital Strategy’ also includes a commitment to ‘provide 
clear lines of accountability on data and algorithm use at the top of all policing organisations, 
including accessible complaints and redress processes. This could be achieved by extending the 
Data Protection Officer role and updating Chief Officer responsibilities.’118 As part of ‘updating 
Chief Officer responsibilities’, it appears necessary to assign a ‘senior responsible owner’ for 
each policing algorithm to ensure ultimate accountability for the performance of the tool and 
how it is deployed.119
In addition to technical transparency, legal issues could arise if the decision-making process 
of which the algorithm is part is opaque to the data subject or to the decision-maker. As 
summarised by the Law Society, ‘when an individual is faced with a decision or a measure in a 
criminal justice context, it is critical they can assess it was legitimate, justified, and ultimately, 
legal’.120 As such, when an algorithmic system is used in a criminal justice context, or when the 
output may eventually form part of an evidential process or trigger an intervention, the details 
of the system must be sufficiently intelligible both to the decision-maker and to the subject, in 
particular what factors were taken into account during analysis.
114. Author interview with A3, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
115. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
116. Author telephone interview with L12 and L13, police respondents, 15 August 2019.
117. Author telephone interview with L5, senior police technologist, 10 July 2019.
118. NPCC and APCC, ‘National Policing Digital Strategy’, p. 15.
119. Ibid.
120. The Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the Justice System and the Law Society of 
England and Wales, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System’, p. 21.
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Commercial and Procurement Considerations
The research highlighted significant risks associated with police procurement of commercial 
algorithms, particularly relating to the force’s ability to scrutinise the system and the data used 
to build it. In many cases, algorithms used by the police are developed for different purposes 
and trained on non-police data:
The use of the term ‘machine learning’ is an issue. The majority of tools used by the police are machine 
learned, they are not by and large true machine learning. Tools come to you as learned versions, they 
are not continuing to learn.121
One of the problems with buying ML tools is if you don’t have access to the training data. You’re probably 
better off data testing it yourself beforehand … For instance, if we use tools that have been developed 
based on crime data from the US and then apply it to the UK, it’s a very different policing context.122
It may be difficult to submit algorithms for independent evaluation if the intellectual property is 
confidential and owned by a third-party developer,123 and the procurer of the system may need to 
inspect the algorithm in detail, which almost ‘undermines the point of outsourcing’.124 When the 
police procure pre-trained algorithms, the data on which the model was trained is unlikely to be 
representative of operational police data, necessitating re-testing with representative operational 
data. In these circumstances, transfer learning – whereby a pre-trained model is downloaded 
and re-trained on new data – could be a suitable approach, as this does not necessarily require 
access to the original training data.125 However, the transfer learning process requires specialist 
data science expertise, meaning the force would still need to build its own data science capability.
Partly for these reasons, several police forces have focused efforts on building in-house data science 
expertise rather than outsourcing to third-party developers. As summarised by one police interviewee:
To have an external supplier-contract setup is quite sub-optimal for a few reasons … Ideally all this 
expertise needs to be in-house. We wouldn’t outsource our arrests, we wouldn’t outsource our 
intelligence functions. Why are we outsourcing analytics? We need to build these capabilities ourselves. 
Analytics is seen as an expensive luxury but actually it can be really affordable.126
However, while some forces (such as Avon and Somerset Constabulary) have been successful 
in building in-house data science expertise, the majority remain reliant on commercial 
arrangements with third-party providers, raising issues concerning intellectual property and 
commercial confidentiality.
121. Author interview with L14 and L15, senior police technologists, London, 19 September 2019.
122. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 2019.
123. Author telephone interview with A1, academic policing expert, 1 June 2019.
124. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
125. Ibid.
126. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.

III. Bias and Discrimination
‘PREDICTIVE POLICING’ TOOLS have been labelled as ‘racially biased’, with claims that they over-predict individuals from certain racial groups or particular neighbourhoods where postcode functions as a ‘proxy variable’ for race.127 However, it is important to 
note that most studies purporting to demonstrate racial bias in policing algorithms are based 
on analysis conducted in the US, and there is insufficient evidence to assess the extent to which 
these concerns are transferable to the UK context.
In relation to predictive mapping, concerns have been raised that racially biased police 
practices may become encoded into a statistical algorithm, leading to certain areas receiving a 
disproportionately large police presence.128 However, very few empirical studies have actually 
examined the issue of bias in predictive policing algorithms, and the only randomised controlled 
trial that has been conducted found no significant differences in the proportion of arrests by 
racial-ethnic group between locations where mapping software was and was not deployed.129 
The authors note, however, that ‘whether the same outcomes would hold given changes 
in implementation is uncertain’, and that ‘continued empirical scrutiny along with careful 
policy development will be needed to guard against bias in predictive policing and ensure 
fairness in outcomes’.130
Based on a review of the academic literature, it appears that there is currently a lack of sufficient 
empirical evidence to assess the extent to which bias in police use of algorithms actually occurs 
in practice in England and Wales, and whether this results in unlawful discrimination. Having 
said this, research has consistently demonstrated racial bias in policing and criminal justice 
outcomes more generally (though the extent to which this is due to unlawful discrimination 
is unclear).131 These disparities are inevitably encoded into police-recorded data, which could 
lead to algorithmic outputs which replicate or even amplify these biases inherent in the data. 
127. For example, see Solon Barocas and Andrew D Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Impact’, California Law 
Review (Vol. 104, No. 3, 2016), pp. 671–732; Richardson, Schultz and Crawford, ‘Dirty Data, Bad 
Predictions’; Danielle Ensign et al., ‘Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing’, Proceedings 
of Machine Learning Research (Vol. 81, 2018), pp. 1–12.
128. Sarah Brayne, ‘Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing’, American Sociological Review (Vol. 82, 
No. 5, 2017), pp. 977–1008.
129. P Jeffrey Brantingham, Matthew Valasik and George O Mohler, ‘Does Predictive Policing Lead to 
Biased Arrests? Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial’, Statistics and Public Policy (Vol. 5,  
No. 1, 2018), pp. 1–6.
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131. For further discussion, see Niamh Eastwood, Michael Shiner and Daniel Bear, The Numbers in 
Black and White: Ethnic Disparities in the Policing and Prosecution of Drug Offences in England and 
Wales (London: Release Publications, 2013); David Lammy, ‘The Lammy Review: An Independent 
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Officers recognised the risk of bias in police decision-making, with comments such as ‘there 
is bias across everything we do’,132 ‘whenever we have to decide an outcome there’s always 
an opportunity for bias’,133 and ‘everyone has an element of bias that is unbeknown to them 
… The algorithms don’t come with human biases themselves, but they do potentially reflect 
underlying biases’.134
Research for this study has found that bias could be introduced at various stages in the project 
lifecycle, necessitating ongoing monitoring and tracking of discrimination risk. There are four 
distinct phases in a police analytics project where bias may be introduced: problem formulation; 
design; testing; and deployment.
Problem Formulation
At the early ‘problem formulation’ phase, predictive technological solutions have been criticised 
for focusing on low-level ‘nuisance’ crime, or on areas with high crime levels and thus poor 
neighbourhoods.135 The choice of which crime types to focus on may itself be biased, leading 
to a disproportionate deployment of resources: ‘there’s another level of bias which is around 
certain types of crime being more heavily prioritised, and unclear reasons for prioritising certain 
things over others’.136
Bias may be introduced in the way the police ‘frame a problem’ (for instance, the labels used 
to record certain crime types).137 The choice of which crimes to analyse may create false 
impressions regarding the scale of such criminal activity, with one interviewee explaining that 
‘we are “flashing our flashlight” at this area and so will find offending’.138 As well as reflecting 
structural inequalities in society, police data is a reflection of police activity, much of which is 
proactive and ‘intelligence led’, meaning that the data may reflect operational priorities which 
may themselves be biased.139
In addition, many problems may not lend themselves to a technological solution, and the strong 
financial incentives on police forces to develop ‘innovative’ digital solutions may create a bias in 
favour of digital solutions, without equal consideration of non-technological measures. Reliance 
Review into the Treatment of, and Outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Individuals in 
the Criminal Justice System’, September 2017.
132. Author telephone interview with L7, senior police respondent, 18 July 2019.
133. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
134. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 
2019.
135. Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens 
Democracy (New York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2016).
136. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
137. Author telephone interview with A5, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
138. Author telephone interview with L9 and L10, police investigator and analyst, 1 August 2019.
139. Author telephone interview with A5, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
Alexander Babuta and Marion Oswald 31
on algorithmic tools may create a ‘risk of modelling very complex social issues in an over-
simplistic way’, leading to a ‘selective understanding of criminal behaviour’, disproportionately 
affecting individuals who are more likely to come into contact with the police (for instance, 
those with mental-health issues).140
Design
When designing a police algorithm, the choice of dataset(s) is crucial to minimise risk of bias. All 
datasets will be skewed to some degree, but this does not necessarily imply unfair discrimination. 
As one senior police technologist noted: ‘From a statistical point of view, we recognise that all 
datasets are biased’.141 This recognition was further highlighted by an academic legal expert, 
who stated that:
For each of the negative grounds, bias can come in at various levels. It can come in when people are 
reporting crime, it could come in at stop and search, it could come in at judicial decision-making. 
Unequal base rates could be another source of bias, not necessarily due to real-world discrimination.142
There was recognition that police-recorded data is rarely an accurate statistical record of crime:
A fundamental issue is that these police algorithms are built using police data. Crime records, other 
police-recorded information, which is of itself not an accurate record of crime, but merely a record 
of policing. That will inevitably lead to certain areas, certain communities, certain people being over-
represented on those databases. It’s in no way a statistically accurate record of actual crime.143
If you’re interested in where crime is happening, it’s not just arrest data you need to use, you need to 
look at everything.144
Removing demographic variables from the statistical model is unlikely to be sufficient to 
eliminate bias, as these demographic features could be implicitly encoded in other variables in 
ways that are not always immediately apparent:
Just because you take out explicit or sensitive data such as someone’s race or sex, machine learning 
algorithms can make inferences and connect the dots between all the different data sources they have.145
In many cases, it may be desirable to keep certain demographic variables within the statistical 
model to assess differences in offending patterns between demographic groups:
140. Author telephone interview with A4, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
141. Author interview with L14 and L15, senior police technologists, London, 19 September 2019.
142. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
143. Author interview with C1, representative of civil society organisation, London, 7 October 2019.
144. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 2019.
145. Author interview with A3, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
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Interestingly, there are some characteristics of offenders that are based on clear criminological theory. 
Understanding those issues is also crucial when you’re looking at your build and the outputs you’re 
getting … We’re really clear about every piece of data that’s in our tool. We’ve made decisions early 
on that we will put ethnicity and gender in there, because we want to see what impact that will have 
on prediction.146
However, problems may arise when attempting to determine whether an imbalance in the 
dataset is indicative of unfair discrimination or reflective of real-world differences in offending 
distribution across demographics. As one academic interviewee pointed out, ‘this is not just a 
job for the data scientist alone. This requires domain expertise and input from other experts’.147
Testing
Concerns were raised regarding the criteria against which police technology projects are 
evaluated, with comments such as ‘police forces are very keen to try something out but typically 
very bad at evaluation’.148 In the context of crime prevention, it can be impossible to assess the 
‘predictive accuracy’ of statistical tools in the field, because there is no way of knowing what 
may have happened if the police did not intervene to prevent the predicted outcome from 
happening. As summarised by one academic expert, ‘you can’t just release someone to see if 
they’re going to be dangerous’.149
For this reason, policing algorithms are typically validated retrospectively using a sample for 
which the ultimate outcomes are known. This does not take into account model shrinkage, 
overfitting and concept drift as a result of applying the tool to new, unfamiliar data.150 As 
summarised by Douglas Mossman, ‘By their very design, [statistical risk assessment tools] 
depend on relationships established in specific populations at specific times in the past, 
and these relationships may not apply, or may not apply in exactly the same way, to future 
populations living in different social contexts and circumstances’.151 Interviewees recognised 
that issues may arise when procuring commercial off-the-shelf tools which are trained in a 
particular geographical area but then deployed in another,152 and that ‘whenever you’re moving 
from one area to another, then clearly you have to do further validation and calibration’.153 As 
146. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
147. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
148. Author interview with A6, academic and policy expert, London, 13 August 2019.
149. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
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noted by one police representative, ‘You’ll always have some attrition between your high level 
of accuracy that an ML output can give you, and how it is deployed in the hands of the user. 
High-level accuracy results will inevitably be much lower in the field than [what] they claim to be’.154
When assessing the operational benefits of a policing algorithm, a focus on ‘predictive accuracy’ 
may distract attention away from whether the tool is having any real-world impact in preventing, 
detecting or reducing crime. This requires a testing process that looks beyond the algorithm to 
also assess the interventions made on the basis of the prediction:
If you start producing predictions and then those predictions are acted upon, how is that happening 
and how does that feed back into the process? You need to incorporate feedback loops to assess how 
these predictions are being acted upon.155
Deployment
It has been argued that the deployment of predictive policing algorithms may lead to certain 
minority groups being disproportionately targeted, creating ‘feedback loops’ of discrimination:
We pile loads of resources into a certain area and it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Purely 
because there’s more policing going into that area, not necessarily because of discrimination on the 
part of officers.156
Typically, we put our resources in deprived areas where there are high crime levels, and generally those 
areas tend to be where there is a large ethnic minority group … If we simply make that decision based on 
algorithms, a particular ethnic community may be getting a disproportionately large police response.157
There is a risk that the use of algorithmic predictions could lead to human users ‘making causal 
inferences that do not hold up to scrutiny’, which will ‘operationalise the biases’ present in 
the data.158 Recent research carried out by innovation foundation Nesta discovered that ‘when 
practitioners artifice they will, in the vast majority of cases, draw on elements of professional 
intuition, together with unconscious bias, to inform the intuitive element of the decision-making 
process’.159 Automation bias and confirmation bias are particular concerns in this regard:
154. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
155. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 2019.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid.
158. Author telephone interview with A4, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
159. Thea Snow, ‘Decision-Making in the Age of the Algorithm’, Nesta, November 2019, <https://media.
nesta.org.uk/documents/Decision-making_in_the_age_of_the_algorithm.pdf>, accessed  
19 January 2020.
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The more the machine points the human in a particular direction, the more likely the human is to follow 
this without question.160
There’s a real danger on becoming over-reliant on poor-quality algorithmic systems at the expense of 
informed human decision-making.161
Confirmation bias is the greatest concern, feedback loops around our high-priority offenders and 
potentially missing other pockets of criminality or offending.162
Nesta’s research highlights that there is a delicate balance to be struck, ‘discouraging 
practitioner deference to the tool, but not to the point that they feel nervous to use it at all’.163 
The College of Policing’s APP advises that ‘RI [risk identification], RA [risk assessment] and RM 
[risk management] tools should be regarded as an excellent but limited, means of improving 
the likelihood of identifying and preventing future offending or victimisation. They can enhance 
professional judgement but not replace it’.164
Interviewees stressed that the risk-assessment tools used by police forces are being used in this 
advisory capacity, indicated by comments such as:
None of our algorithmic outputs feed an automated decision system. The whole point of this is to 
help make sense of large volumes of data to help practitioners make judgements. It’s the professional 
judgement that determines what will happen … It’s purely a decision-support tool.165
Nevertheless, concerns were raised that over-reliance on machine filtering could lead to other 
relevant factors being ignored.166 As actuarial tools rely on identifying statistically significant 
correlations in historic data, a fully automated approach could mean that practitioners may 
fail to identify relevant risk factors because they were not found to be statistically significant in 
historic data. As one police respondent explained, ‘the algorithm is only as good as the data they 
put in, and often police officers have data in their head that doesn’t get into our systems’.167 
For example, a ‘low-risk’ label could be interpreted to mean that an individual requires no 
further monitoring or intervention. Such ‘low-risk’ individuals may have specific needs and 
vulnerabilities that should be addressed as part of a bespoke risk-management plan; needs and 
vulnerabilities which may not be detected by a statistical algorithm. Such individuals may then 
fail to receive the necessary support to prevent them from returning to problematic behaviour.
160. Author telephone interview with L12 and L13, police respondents, 15 August 2019.
161. Author interview with C1, representative of civil society organisation, London, 7 October 2019.
162. Author telephone interview with L5, senior police technologist, 10 July 2019.
163. Snow, ‘Decision-Making in the Age of the Algorithm’.
164. College of Policing, ‘Authorised Professional Practice: Risk’.
165. Author telephone interview with L4, senior police technologist, 9 July 2019.
166. Author telephone interview with L12 and L13, police respondents, 15 August 2019.
167. Author telephone interview with L5, senior police technologist, 10 July 2019.
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Addressing Bias
The research identified various approaches to addressing risk of bias in police algorithms, 
including using alternative datasets, statistical methods for detecting and eliminating bias, and 
treating the algorithmic output as a form of ‘intelligence’.
In relation to the use of non-police data, one police participant suggested that ‘to address bias, 
we need to be better at information sharing, using data from third parties that may not be 
picked up by the police’.168 However, others questioned whether this would provide sufficient 
reassurance, as ‘the reasons that data becomes biased [aren’t] entirely dependent on how one 
institution behaves, but rather how we as a society behave … It’s still problematic regardless of 
what data is being used’.169 Other participants suggested more sophisticated statistical methods 
for identifying bias and then adjusting the dataset accordingly:
There are ways in which you can do it ranging from excluding attributes, including attributes but 
swapping the labels around, you mess around with the data to some degree so some of the relationships 
are broken on purpose … There are technical ways in a model-building point of view that you can try 
to overcome it.170
One academic expert suggested that ‘there are different stages at which you could intervene 
to try to reduce bias, but changing the data is probably going to be easiest and most similar 
to what they’ve done before’.171 Indeed, several police respondents were aware of computer-
science methods for reducing bias, but acknowledged that these had not yet been implemented 
in existing police technology projects:
We could [look for bias in our analytics] a bit more overtly ... There’s probably a duty to do that.172
I know there are pieces of software that can scan and detect for bias. We haven’t used those, but 
we might in future … We do look at the outputs of the forecasting tool and compare those to our 
population to see if it’s representative.173
However, there may be significant consequences of altering police data such that it no longer 
reflects the data that was recorded – for instance, in relation to the GDPR requirement that 
personal data is, where possible, kept accurate and up to date.
168. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
169. Author telephone interview with C2, representative of civil society organisation, 17 October 2019.
170. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 2019.
171. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019. For further discussion 
on the issue of fairness in machine learning algorithms, see Reuben Binns, ‘Fairness in Machine 
Learning: Lessons from Political Philosophy’, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research (Vol. 81, 
2018), pp. 149–59.
172. Author telephone interview with L5, senior police technologist, 10 July 2019.
173. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
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Bearing in mind the difficulties associated with eliminating bias from a dataset, roundtable 
participants suggested that – rather than attempting to ‘fix’ the data, it may be more constructive 
to focus on ensuring fairness in the outcomes of the overall analytical process.174 In particular, 
several respondents suggested that the output of an algorithmic prediction should be treated 
as a form of intelligence, and therefore associated with levels of confidence for the officer to 
consider when taking the output into account:
Should you treat this type of information as a form of intelligence?  My personal view is that this is 
essential for the future. There is guidance out there about handling probabilistic data in the operational 
community in terms of the corroborative value – the need to look at continuity, validity and integrity.175
Officers are quite comfortable with intelligence feeding into decision-making, what we need to work 
out is how the output of an algorithm feeds into that process.176
Treating algorithmic insights as a form of intelligence would place the burden of responsibility 
on the human user to demonstrate that they had critically assessed the validity and relevance of 
such information when forming their overall judgement or decision, thereby ensuring ultimate 
accountability of the overall decision-making process. It would be incumbent on the user to 
ensure that any subsequent action taken on the basis of the algorithmic prediction was not 
unfairly discriminatory.
174. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
175. Author telephone interview with L8, senior police officer, 23 July 2019.
176. Roundtable event organised in partnership with techUK, London, 22 July 2019.
IV. Regulation, Governance and 
Oversight
Current Framework
INTERVIEWEES UNIVERSALLY RECOGNISED a lack of any official national guidelines or standards for police use of algorithms:
There are many statutes relevant to operational work of the police and other agencies but it’s not clear 
how these relate to data analytics.177
There is no strong guidance, no regulation. What governs our behaviour and conduct is the Code of 
Ethics. Within the Code of Ethics, which standards of professional behaviour would apply to the use of 
an algorithm? I’m not sure … there’s not much governing the use of algorithms specifically.178
There are no professional standards that I’m aware of … You can call upon various pieces of law, but I 
think it’s important that we have more specificity … There are lots of codes of practice around specific 
data capabilities, but none that govern the use of algorithms specifically.179
In the area of predictive algorithms, the NPPC’s Business Change Council has adopted the 
‘Algocare’ model, and together with additional explanatory documentation, recommends its use 
to Chief Constables. Numerous interviewees mentioned Algocare as the only de-facto national 
guidance.180 Several participants suggested that primary legislation may be needed to regulate 
these new technologies, and that guidance alone was unlikely to provide sufficient safeguards. 
However, one police participant suggested that ‘the ideal legislative framework will be a long 
time coming. We can’t afford to wait for that’, and that ‘if there’s no code of practice, the 
technology will just develop without us’.181 One academic legal expert noted that ‘practitioners 
often struggle with translating and interpreting complex legal frameworks, particularly human 
rights legislation … You can say, we’ll take the safeguards from various different frameworks and 
apply them to predictive policing, but they aren’t specific to predictive policing’.182
177. Author telephone interview with L5, senior police technologist, 10 July 2019.
178. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
179. Author telephone interview with L8, senior police officer, 23 July 2019.
180. See Marion Oswald et al., ‘Algorithmic Risk Assessment Policing Models: Lessons from the Durham 
HART Model and “Experimental” Proportionality’, Information & Communications Technology Law 
(Vol. 27, No. 2, 2018), pp. 223–50.
181. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
182. Author interview with A3, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
38 Data Analytics and Algorithms in Policing
The importance of clear guidance and adherence to it has been emphasised in other contexts. 
For instance, in R Bridges vs. Chief Constable of the South Wales Police, the High Court of 
England and Wales dismissed the claim that the generic legal framework (consisting of the 
common law, data protection and human rights legislation, codes of practice issued under 
legislation and the police’s own local policies) was insufficient to govern the police’s trial of live 
facial recognition (LFR), and noted that the police force’s own policies were part of the scope 
of existing regulation.183 In light of this judgment, the MPS recently announced that the force 
will be deploying LFR technology operationally, and published a series of documents on their 
website including an LFR guidance document and standard operating procedure detailing the 
authorisation process that must be followed, operational parameters of when, where and how it 
will be deployed, and guidance regarding the generation and management of LFR watchlists.184
Similarly, a new set of nationally approved guidelines appears essential to ensure the lawful 
and ethical development and deployment of statistical algorithms for policing. Recognising this 
requirement, the new ‘National Policing Digital Strategy’ outlines a commitment to ‘develop 
a National Data Ethics Governance model, which will outline standards and guidelines to be 
adhered to and embedded in our decision making processes’.185 The following sections provide 
recommendations on what should be included in these new guidelines, based on the findings 
of the research.
Ethical Oversight
There was widespread recognition among research participants of the need for meaningful 
independent ‘ethical oversight’ of police data analytics projects, but a lack of clarity on how 
this should be achieved in practice. In particular, it remains unclear whether this oversight 
should be delivered at the local force level, or in the form of a centralised national structure. 
While various groups currently provide ethical oversight to policing, there remains a lack of 
consistency in approach between forces, and unclear delineation of local, regional and national 
responsibilities.
While all police forces in England and Wales have now established local ethics committees,186 
these are not focused on digital technology, and several interviewees suggested that they lack 
the necessary technical expertise to meaningfully scrutinise police technology projects. A senior 
police officer noted that:
183. R Bridges vs. Chief Constable of the South Wales Police, High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench 
Division, CO/4085/2018, 4 September 2019, para. 84. This judgment is now subject to appeal, and 
so must be treated with a degree of caution.
184. Metropolitan Police Service, ‘Live Facial Recognition’, <https://www.met.police.uk/live-facial-
recognition-trial/>, accessed 28 January 2020.
185. NPCC and APCC, ‘National Policing Digital Strategy’, p. 15.
186. Some of these are joint force initiatives, meaning that one committee provides oversight to several 
regional forces.
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Our ethics committee are nowhere near this sort of subject matter and wouldn’t be qualified to provide 
appropriate oversight and direction on this. Potentially if you had the right people around the table 
it could work well … In my experience of how ethics committees are currently set up, it would need 
something different and bespoke in order to meet this need.187
Conversely, another police participant disagreed, suggesting that existing ethics committees 
could be adapted to incorporate scrutiny of data analytics:
We have our ethics committee already. Ethics committees nationally need to pivot into the modern 
world. There’s no reason why you can’t have local data scientists on those committees. We’ve taken 
the use of predictive analytics to our ethics committees previously. I don’t think we need another 
committee to deal with that.188
Recognising a requirement for a ‘bespoke’ option, WMP has created its own data ethics 
committee, the first of its kind within UK policing, to advise the Chief Constable and Police and 
Crime Commissioner (PCC) on the force’s data analytics projects. A WMP roundtable participant 
explained that ‘we want extensive public consultation before we roll out anything’, expressing 
a desire to ‘create a culture of ethics by design’ and ensure that ethical issues are reviewed at 
regular intervals throughout the research process.189
Interviewees praised the WMP data ethics committee and tasking process for providing a robust 
and unique level of scrutiny not currently replicated across other areas of policing.190 However, 
concerns were raised regarding its resourcing, scaleability and long-term sustainability, as well 
as its influencing power. One civil society representative commented that ‘I think the WMP 
ethics committee is a good model. The problem is that’s almost entirely dependent on goodwill 
and a good relationship between the PCC and the force. They don’t have any actual power other 
than the fact that WMP have agreed to listen to the decisions of the ethics committee’.191 The 
new ‘National Policing Digital Strategy’ also commits to establishing ‘a core principle that the 
public’s views on data analytics are pro-actively built into an ethical assessment at the design 
stage of any digitally-enabled service improvement’.192 However, it is unclear how such a process 
would be implemented in practice across all 43 forces, and whether it will be accompanied by a 
commitment to halt or review projects if this were the suggested outcome of the consultation.
There was also concern that force-level ethics committees may not be scaleable to the national 
level, and may lead to a culture of ‘postcode ethics’,193 with some interviewees arguing that there 
is a need for a centralised structure, which could also include other law enforcement agencies 
187. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
188. Author telephone interview with L4, senior police technologist, 9 July 2019.
189. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
190. Ibid.
191. Author interview with C1, representative of civil society organisation, London, 7 October 2019.
192. NPCC and APCC, ‘National Policing Digital Strategy’, p. 15.
193. Author telephone interview with L8, senior police officer, 23 July 2019.
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such as the National Crime Agency.194 The Independent Digital Ethics Panel for Policing was 
mentioned by several interviewees as an existing structure which could provide this national-
level oversight,195 but concerns were raised regarding its long-term resourcing and access to 
relevant expertise. Participants also noted the risk of ‘creating layers and layers of oversight’ 
and introducing resource-demanding review processes which may stifle innovation.196
It was also suggested by one civil society representative that ethics committees could ‘act as a fig 
leaf over wider discussions’ that the police should be having directly with the general public.197 
Nevertheless, police participants recognised that ‘transparency is the most important thing. 
The moment we hide anything, we lose public trust’.198 Interviewees recognised the importance 
of including independent academic institutions in the ethical review process. As summarised 
by one police interviewee, ‘there’s a big case for links to academics, the local university links. 
There’s a natural opportunity there to use them as part of external scrutiny and ethics’.199
In summary, it is crucial to ensure independent review and scrutiny of police data analytics 
projects, at both the local and national level. Whether existing ethics committees are sufficient 
to provide this oversight, or whether bespoke ‘digital ethics committees’ need to be established 
in parallel, is a matter of debate. The UK Police Ethics Guidance Group should conduct a 
comprehensive review to assess whether existing ethics committees could be ‘upskilled’ to 
provide meaningful ethical review of police technology projects, or whether bespoke digital 
ethics committees should be established in parallel. This review should also assess the viability 
of a national or regional ethics review process based on consistent terms of reference.
Roles and Responsibilities
There are several participants in the ‘regulatory space’200 relevant to police use of data 
analytics. Some play a major role, including Chief Constables, Police and Crime Commissioners, 
the College of Policing, NPCC, HMICFRS and the Home Office. Others have a more limited 
influence or one confined to specific issues, including the Information Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO), Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, Surveillance Camera Commissioner and 
Forensic Science Regulator (FSR). Furthermore, several bodies are engaging in advisory or 
investigatory activities, including the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, the Office for 
Artificial Intelligence, parliamentary committees, independent committees, bodies with sector 
expertise or policymaking functions, and campaigning organisations.
194. Ibid.
195. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
196. Author telephone interview with L12 and L13, police respondents, 15 August 2019.
197. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
198. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 2019.
199. Author telephone interview with L4, senior police technologist, 9 July 2019.
200. Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran, ‘Organizing Regulatory Space’, in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott 
and Christopher Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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Despite this crowded regulatory space, there is a lack of clarity regarding the delineation of 
responsibilities between these organisations for the development of guidance and standards, 
regulation and oversight of police use of data analytics:
It all overlaps and intertwines … The ICO, FSR, all the other regulators, they all have different 
codes of conduct.201
For data protection, we go to the ICO. But for ethics, it’s more emerging, it’s progressing, it’s a bit 
harder to pin down.202
I don’t see the present regulatory environment as being comfortable about the increasing complexities 
of data. Where does the ICO finish and the FSR start?203
Several interviewees proposed a ‘co-regulatory approach’ for police use of data analytics, 
involving the establishment of new multi-agency teams to develop new guidance, set minimum 
standards, and oversee and inspect against those new standards:
Before we allocate responsibility around this, the regulatory roles and responsibilities need to 
be determined, and there might need to be a joint regulatory team drawing on expertise from 
various regulators.204
There is a great deal of focus in new legislation on co-regulatory approaches, but these aren’t being 
implemented in practice as yet from what I’ve seen. That needs to be avoided if we are to avoid the 
mistakes of the past.205
As police use of data analytics engages various legal frameworks, a collaborative approach seems 
appropriate in this context. Interviewees suggested that the development of new guidelines 
and standards would require a joint approach between the NPCC, the Home Office and the 
College of Policing:
The Home Office have a crucial part to play in setting those standards for policing, whether those are 
cross-government standards that a department like CDEI might come up with … The College of Policing 
is a national body that should develop the service, so they need to be engaged. The NPCC together with 
the College probably need to be at the heart of this for the sake of policing, so we’re not leaving all 43 
forces to do their own thing.206
201. Author telephone interview with L11, police technologist and analyst, 1 August 2019.
202. Roundtable event organised in partnership with techUK, London, 22 July 2019.
203. Author telephone interview with L8, senior police officer, 23 July 2019.
204. Ibid.
205. Author interview with A3, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
206. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
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Regarding regulation, oversight and enforcement of these new standards, there was agreement 
that it would be counter-productive to attempt to create a new regulatory body. Rather, 
roundtable participants suggested that the ICO is the most appropriate body to scrutinise 
forces’ use of data analytics, in conjunction with the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHCR).207 The ICO was recognised as having the necessary statutory backing to enforce against 
national standards, but was described by one academic expert as being ‘woefully underfunded’, 
with all of its funding coming from fees levied on data controllers, and no funding provided by 
central government.208
There was widespread recognition of the crucial role of HMICFRS in inspecting forces against a 
new set of national standards:
HMIC assessments directly affect how policing learns and cuts its costs. The PEEL inspection process 
now is so rigorous and robust, it’s a real opportunity to get things into policing through our industry 
watchdog … In five years’ time, I would expect the deployment of algorithms to be a standard thing that 
HMIC are looking at, alongside other points of delivery in policing.209
HMIC are good at inspecting against an agreed set of standards perhaps set by another body. If, for 
example, CDEI were able to say these were the agreed standards, HMIC would be a good body to inspect 
against those … It would have to be undertaken by somebody who has some level of understanding of 
how these projects are undertaken.210
The organisational framework is already in place to incorporate police use of data analytics into 
HMICFRS inspections, as there is a dedicated team focused specifically on crime data integrity 
inspections.211 In 2020/21, HMICFRS should establish an External Reference Group for police 
use of data analytics, with a view to updating the crime data integrity inspection framework to 
include inspection against the proposed new guidance. This should draw upon the combined 
expertise of the ICO and the EHRC, and engage external subject matter expertise (for instance, 
from data scientists and specialist legal experts).
In addition to a new framework for guidance, inspection and oversight, a 
new centralised committee should be established to coordinate the use of 
algorithms across policing in England and Wales.212 This group should maintain a 
high-level catalogue of all algorithms used by police forces nationwide to inform operational 
decision-making, to encourage cooperation between forces, sharing of best practices and 
avoidance of duplication. The group could also introduce a mechanism by which consistent 
specialist expertise can be accessed by police forces in the areas of data science, ethics and tool 
207. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
208. Ibid.
209. Author telephone interview with L4, senior police technologist, 9 July 2019.
210. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
211. Author interview with R1 and R2, members of regulatory/oversight body, London, 14 August 2019.
212. Author interview with L14 and L15, senior police technologists, London, 19 September 2019.
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evaluation, and explore the feasibility of establishing a mechanism for police forces to access a 
centralised team of specialist legal advisers, in a similar way that government departments can 
access specialist legal advice via the Government Legal Department.213 
Towards a New Policy Framework
Any future policy or guidance should be ‘tech-agnostic’ and principles based. Rather than 
establishing prescriptive rules and standards for different data technologies, the framework 
should instead establish standardised processes to ensure that data analytics projects follow 
recommended routes for empirical evaluation of algorithms within their operational context 
and evaluate the project against legal requirements and ethical standards:
It needs to be tech-agnostic, it can’t become out of date this time next year. It needs to be generic enough 
to stand the test of time, but it needs to give us clear direction so we can apply a consistent model.214
Because ultimately everything becomes very problem specific, it would be difficult to have a one size 
fits all and be prescriptive about what methods should be used in specific circumstances. What I’ve not 
seen is guidance that talks about what the process should involve. The broad questions there about 
avoiding discrimination, ensuring data quality, that kind of thing.215
The guidance may need to include separate sections for different technologies, as the legal and 
ethical considerations will vary depending on the tool and application.216 Existing surveillance 
codes and related inspections were suggested as a potential model, as there are numerous 
existing codes of practice for surveillance, each governing specific activities or technologies.217
In terms of establishing a standardised, ‘tech-agnostic’ process for police data analytics projects, 
the cross-industry standard process for data mining (CRISP-DM) is a useful starting point, though 
various other models exist.218 An overview of the CRISP-DM process is replicated in Figure 3.
213. Author telephone interview with A4, academic expert in policing and criminal justice, 11 July 2019.
214. Author telephone interview with L1, senior police officer, 1 July 2019.
215. Author telephone interview with L2 and L3, senior police officer and police technologist, 4 July 2019.
216. Author interview with A2, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
217. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
218. Roundtable event organised by RUSI and CDEI, London, 25 July 2019.
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Figure 3: Simplified Overview of the Cross-Industry Standardised Process for Data Mining (CRISP-DM)
Source: SmartVision, ‘What is the CRISP-DM Methodology?’, <https://www.sv-europe.com/crisp-dm-
methodology/>, accessed 28 January 2020.
Of particular importance is the need to start with a clear ‘business understanding’ before moving 
into the ‘data analytics’ phase. In the policing context, this means starting with a clear business 
case documenting the problem the force is hoping to address, the reasons for selecting that 
problem, and why it is believed that this problem may lend itself to a technological solution. 
This contrasts with the ‘exploratory’ approach, which involves starting with the data analysis 
and not establishing a clear purpose for analysis until after the insights have been generated.
Alongside the CRISP-DM approach for data mining, the Agile project delivery cycle, as defined 
in the UK government’s service manual, provides a useful and useable framework for overall 
project management of police data analytics projects.219
219. UK Government, ‘Agile Delivery’, <https://www.gov.uk/service-manual/agile-delivery>, accessed 
28 January 2020.
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The following specific areas of focus are particularly relevant in the policing context, and must 
be explicitly included in any new guidance.
Legal, Ethical and Operational Input
Multi-disciplinary input at the start of a project is essential to assess the evidence on the 
particular problem under investigation and whether it lends itself to algorithmic analysis, 
the subjective nature of particular data, the risk of proxies for protected characteristics, the 
implications of errors for interventions, the legal basis for the use of a tool, and data protection 
and human rights concerns. In establishing a clear business case, the force should critically 
assess whether any additional resource investment is outweighed by the potential efficiency 
savings provided by the technology. Beyond specialist data science expertise, efforts should be 
made to receive ongoing feedback from academic criminologists and legal experts.
Integrated Impact Assessment
There was a strong sentiment among interviewees that there should be a mandatory requirement 
for an integrated impact assessment, incorporating:
• Data protection impact assessment.
• Equality impact assessment, describing the potential impact of the proposed project on 
people with protected characteristics.
• Human rights impact assessment.
• Empirical evaluation of accuracy and operational assessment of ‘real-world’ effectiveness.
• Assessment of expected level of errors where this can be established or estimated and 
potential consequences of these errors.
• Assessment of any positive obligations under Article 2 or Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights or associated public safeguarding issues.
• Assessment of any other legal requirements which may be relevant for specific projects 
(for instance, investigatory powers authorisations, evidential or valid decision-making 
requirements pursuant to criminal procedure, PACE requirements and investigations 
legislation, and any limitations on interventions a statistical algorithm may inform).
• Independent ethical assessment, the format of which will depend on what ethical 
oversight arrangements are in place.
The impact assessment should be considered a ‘live’ document and should be subject to regular 
review should the scope, context or purpose of the project change over time.
Standard Process for Model Development
A standard process for model development is essential to create consistency in approach and 
ensure relevant legal and ethical issues are taken into account in the tool design phase. This 
process should include an assessment of data requirements, both in terms of what data is 
needed to build the tool, how the input data will be analysed and how the resulting output 
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will be stored and shared. Many projects will not require personal data, and when assessing 
whether a particular intrusion of privacy is necessary to achieve a particular policing aim, the 
force should assess whether the same insights could be derived by using an aggregated or 
anonymised dataset, rather than personal data.220
Procurement Considerations
To ensure meaningful scrutiny of data analytics software, the guidance should advise on 
appropriate rights as part of contractual agreements with any third-party supplier, such as:
• Knowledge of, and confidence in, the training datasets used to build the model.
• Appropriate access to algorithmic workings to facilitate third-party investigation and 
questioning in an adversarial context.
• Rights to use, amend and disclose the tool, its workings and input datasets where 
required for legitimate public sector decision-making.
• Regular rights of audit, testing and validation.
• Rights to require updating of the model, removing or adding input factors.
• Rights to request use of a data science expert as a witness to explain the algorithmic tool 
(for instance, in a criminal justice context).
Testing and Evaluation
Robust, empirical testing should be a core focus of any new framework. Participants highlighted 
a lack of guidance on how trials should be conducted and evaluated, describing how police 
forces are ‘being actively encouraged to develop this technology’ but ‘experimenting without 
any cloak of protection’.221 As described by one police interviewee, ‘it is essential to have a new 
framework for evaluation, and a standardised methodology for testing … We have to be allowed 
to test and to be allowed to fail … How do we generate an empirical evidence base if we are not 
allowed to test?’.222
The interviewee suggested that the testing and evaluation process should include three stages:
Bench test (to assess whether the tool performs the required analysis as expected in a controlled 
setting); Scenario test (empirical validation against operationally relevant data, to establish whether 
the police’s data lends itself to such analysis); Operational test (including how the human responds to 
the analytical output).223
Effective testing requires establishing specific, measurable and achievable evaluation criteria at 
the outset. This testing should also include an assessment of whether the algorithmic outputs 
220. Author interview with A6, academic and policy expert, London, 13 August 2019.
221. Author interview with L14 and L15, senior police technologists, London, 19 September 2019.
222. Ibid.
223. Ibid.
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are systematically skewed or biased towards a particular group or individuals within that group. 
In the context of machine learning, statistical models require ongoing, iterative review and 
validation: ‘It is about the continuing testing, validation, calibration. The danger is you design a 
robust tool and then that’s it. But it’s got to be looked at again over time’.224
Evaluation Standards
Universal evaluation standards may be needed to ensure the quality and empirical validity of 
algorithms used for policing (as is already the case for forensic science), ‘mapped against a 
rigorous scientific standard that is subject to inspection’.225 It appears to be essential to establish 
context-specific evaluation methodologies to ensure the scientific validity of statistical algorithms 
used by the police, but it remains unclear where this responsibility should lie. Guidance is also 
needed on how confidence levels and error rates should be established, communicated and 
evaluated. Clarity is needed from the Home Office regarding who should be responsible for 
establishing these evaluation methodologies.
Human Interaction with the Tool and Classification of the Output
The decision-making process informed by the algorithm requires as much attention as the tool 
itself. Consideration should be given to how the output is presented to the officer and whether 
presenting a conclusive classification without revealing uncertainties could unduly influence 
officer judgement. Algorithmic outputs are by their nature uncertain. As summarised by one 
academic, ‘there needs to be a lot of training in terms of letting police officers know these 
systems are not infallible, they need to be made aware of the types of errors that can be made 
… What should be the focus is not just on the data that gets inputted into the system but on 
acknowledging the risks in interpreting these datasets’.226
Consideration must be given to how outputs are classified in police information systems (for 
instance, as a form of ‘intelligence’ alongside a confidence rating), thus limiting the extent to 
which they can be used or disclosed. Specific guidance may be needed to ensure officers are 
able to interpret and use the insights in conjunction with their own professional judgement. 
This would need to integrate with both the National Decision Model and Management of Police 
Information guidelines.
Data-Driven Interventions
It is crucial throughout all stages of the project to be mindful of what interventions the 
algorithmic insight may feed into and to be specific about the potential end use(s) of the tool. 
Many deployments of police algorithms and automation will not impact significantly on citizens’ 
224. Author interview with R3, member of regulatory/oversight body, London, 3 October 2019.
225. Author telephone interview with L6, senior police officer, 10 July 2019.
226. Author interview with A3, academic legal expert, London, 28 June 2019.
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human rights or civil liberties. However, in a criminal justice context, the use of an analytical 
tool can have profound implications for human rights:
When we’re talking about predictive analytics, it’s worth talking about the context in which you’re 
making that prediction … The sharper end might be very focused on an individual, the softer end might 
be that you identify a specific problem evolving in a specific community, then you go to a school and 
have a focused assembly … You don’t want to be excluding certain tools from the start before you know 
what the insights are … It’s about at what stage in the process you’re excluding certain interventions.227
In particular, the force should regularly review whether the algorithm is still being used for the 
purposes and interventions for which it was developed, or whether it has been ‘re-purposed’ 
and used to inform a different decision-making process.
Ongoing Tracking and Mitigating of Discrimination Risk
It follows from the public sector equality duty and prohibition of unlawful discrimination 
that careful tracking of inputs, outputs, influences on a decision and resultant actions are 
required.228 The predictive weight given to the protected characteristic or proxy is likely to 
be particularly significant in this regard. The generation of a risk score about an individual, or 
their inclusion on a database with a particular label, is likely to engage Article 8 of the ECHR,229 
as would subsequent intrusive action. Being categorised in a way that the individual regards 
as inaccurate, incomplete or offensive may of itself constitute ‘less favourable treatment’ and 
therefore be discriminatory if demonstrated to be due to a protected characteristic. Ongoing 
monitoring and oversight is needed to actively scan for discrimination and assess how statistical 
models may engage protected characteristics.
227. Roundtable event organised by RUSI in partnership with techUK, London, 22 July 2019.
228. ‘Equality Act 2010 (UK)’, Sections 29(6) and 149.
229. Catt vs. UK, European Court of Human Rights, 43514/15, 2019.
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